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 CHAPTER 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO ANNEXATION HANDBOOK III 
 
Sources of Tennessee’s Annexation Law 
 
Current Tennessee annexation law consists of: 
 
 Article XI, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution (“The General Assembly shall by 
general law provide the exclusive methods by which municipalities may be 
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries 
may be altered.”) 
 
 Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101 imposed significant restrictions on municipal 
annexations and incorporations and required growth plans be adopted by all the 
counties of the state that generally limited where municipal annexations could 
occur in those counties.  However, it preserved the existing authorized methods 
of annexation:  ordinance and referendum.  But Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 
drastically limits both annexation by ordinance and by referendum until May 16, 
2015. 
 
 T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51, Part One, generally governs annexation by ordinance 
and referendum in Tennessee.  T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 58 generally governs 
comprehensive growth plans for Tennessee municipalities and counties, and 
contains additional requirements for governing annexations.  T.C.A., Title 6, 
Chapter 51, Parts 2, 3 and 4 govern, respectively, municipal boundary 
contractions, municipal boundary adjustments, and municipal mergers.  Public 
Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 are recent 
significant changes to Tennessee’s annexation law and are incorporated into 
those statutes.  Other statutes throughout Tennessee Code Annotated, have a 
direct and indirect impact on annexation in Tennessee. 
 
 Cases challenging the application of Tennessee’s annexation law.  Many such 
cases were the product of angry annexation battles between cities and targets of 
annexation, between cities and counties, and even between cities and cities over 
the past 25-30 years or so.  Both Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101 and Public 
Acts 2014, Chapter 707 are a product of those battles. 
 
Purposes of Annexation Handbook III  
 
 The Annexation Handbook III has three purposes: 
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 Provide a guide to answer the question of whether a contemplated annexation is 
even legally possible; Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, made the answer to that 
question problematic over the short term, and perhaps over the long term.  
 
 To help municipalities determine whether a contemplated annexation makes 
sense from political and economic perspectives.  Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101 
is responsible for a significant long-term financial obligation of cities to counties 
when the former annexes property in the latter.  But annexation has many 
financial impacts on both the annexing cities and the annexed territory, including 
the cost of providing services to the annexed territory.   
 
 To reconcile the “old” and the “new” annexation laws, the latter generally wrought 
by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707. 
 
Outline of Annexation Handbook III 
 
Annexation Handbook III is divided into 11 chapters, each of which discusses a discrete 
subject in the area of annexation. Following those chapters are a number of appendices 
that contain various annexation forms, including a joint MTAS-CTAS publication on how 
comprehensive growth plans are amended (as modified by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 
707).  Annexation Handbooks I and II contained a copy of the annexation laws found in 
Tennessee Code Annotated; Annexation Handbook III omits that copy because current 
copies of the annexation law are generally available from numerous local sources and 
because Tennessee’s annexation law has changed significantly in recent years, and 
may change even more in the near future.  However Appendix A contains a verbatim 
copy of Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 because of its singular importance. 
 
Annexation Handbook II contained a chapter on “The Right Annexation Done Right.”  
That chapter is omitted in Annexation Handbook III because several appendices deal 
with recent plans of services that reflect annexation studies that are generally superior 
to older ones typical of annexations.  They are a good guide to “The Right Annexation 
Done Right.”1  
 
CHAPTER 1, INTRODUCTION TO ANNEXATION HANDBOOK III.  As the immediate 
preceding text indicates, it explains the purpose of Annexation Handbook III, briefly 
details the sources of annexation law in Tennessee, and provides a quick review of 
what each chapter in Annexation Handbook III contains.  
 
CHAPTER 2, RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY CHANGES IN TENNESSEE 
ANNEXATION LAW, including Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, which imposes seismic 
restrictions on the right of municipalities to annex property, whether by ordinance or by 
referendum, unless the permission of the property owners of the affected property is 
                                
1 See Appendix A for sample annexation feasibility studies. 
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obtained.  Other changes in the annexation laws alter some county growth plan 
procedures affecting some municipalities. 
 
CHAPTER 3, TAX AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION, speaks to the 
“money” implications of annexation, principally those arising from Public Acts 1998, 
Chapter 1101, as amended. 
 
CHAPTERS 4 AND 5, ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM and ANNEXATION BY 
ORDINANCE, respectively, discuss the legal and practical nuts and bolts of annexation, 
both by referendum and by ordinance. The legal nuts and bolts are what hold the 
annexation machine together.  Although annexation by ordinance has an uncertain 
future, the chapter on annexation by ordinance is retained because some activity in that 
area will be going on until at least May 16, 2015.  Those annexation nuts and bolts have 
been drastically changed by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, although some incomplete 
annexations that predate that act may still be on-going, subject to their completion by a 
certain date specified in the act.  This chapter also deals with the important distinction 
between quo warranto challenges to annexation and challenges to annexations brought 
under the Declaratory Judgments Act.  
 
CHAPTER 6, PLAN OF SERVICES, discusses the requirement in the annexation laws 
that annexing municipalities adopt plans of services for the annexed territories, whether 
the annexations are done by ordinance or by referendum.  Public Acts 1998, Chapter 
1101 made that law much stricter than it had been.  Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 
repealed some provisions of Tennessee’s annexation laws, but preserved the laws 
governing plans of services, which presently apply to both annexation by ordinance and 
annexation by referendum. 
 
CHAPTER 7, “POPULATION BRACKETS” CONTAINED IN THE ANNEXATION 
LAW, Annexation Handbook II contained a mind-bending analysis of the statutes in the 
annexation law that exempt from, or include within, certain municipalities based on 
population (and sometimes other) “brackets.”  Many of those brackets were eliminated 
by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, and others probably have limited application after the 
passage of Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101.  In addition, many remaining ones may still 
be constitutionally suspect.  But they remain part of Tennessee’s annexation law, and 
any municipality considering annexation should determine whether any of them are a 
potential annexation impediment. 
 
CHAPTER 8, ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES PUBLIC NOTICE AND 
HEARING ISSUES, considers the statutory hearing requirements that apply to both 
those instruments.  Under Tennessee annexation case law it appears clear that defects 
in hearing requirements must be challenged in a quo warranto proceedings and that  
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persons making such challenges have only a narrow time frame to make a complaint on 
those grounds.  However, most hearing defects can be avoided by the use of a calendar 
and common sense by the annexing municipality. 
 
CHAPTER 9, “PROBLEM” ANNEXATIONS, as its title implies, discusses categories of 
annexations that stand out as particularly troublesome in Tennessee. Those categories 
include corridor annexations, and annexation by acquiescence.  It also points to donut 
hole annexations as a potential problem.  This chapter will also reiterate the important 
distinction between quo warranto challenges to annexations and those brought under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, and the extremely limited application of the latter 
procedure to most annexation cases. 
 
CHAPTER 10, EFFECT OF ANNEXATION ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS, outlines the 
statutes and cases governing the rights of annexing municipalities to provide service in 
the annexed territory, and the limitations under federal and state law limiting that right, 
particularly with respect to certain utility services. 
  
CHAPTER 11, “DEANNEXATION” AND OTHER BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS, deals 
with the laws governing how municipalities “deannex” territory and make boundary 
adjustments by contract.  It also discusses municipal mergers. 
 
Footnotes and Case and Statutory References  
Footnotes are used sparingly in this publication, and infra and supra and other esoteric 
references to cases and statutes not at all. This publication is designed to put statutory 
and case citations at the fingertips of the reader without him or her being required to 
travel forward and backward through it. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY CHANGES IN  
TENNESSEE’S ANNEXATION LAW 
 
Countywide Comprehensive Growth Plan 
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, codified in T.C.A. § 6-58-101 et seq., as amended, 
provides for a comprehensive growth policy plan in each county that is, in theory, 
supposed to guide and direct new development in the county during the next 20 years. 
But it is probably accurate to say that in most counties the critical issue in the formation 
of the comprehensive growth plan was where municipalities could—and could not—
annex territory during that period. 
 
In each county a coordinating committee whose members included representatives from 
the county, cities, utilities, schools, chambers of commerce, soil conservation districts, 
and other entities formulated the initial draft of the growth plan. The county and the 
cities in the county proposed boundaries for inclusion in the plan.  After the growth plan 
was developed, the committee conducted public hearings and submitted the plan to the 
county and city governments for ratification. The committee could revise the plan upon 
objection from any one of these local governments.  If the governmental entities could 
not agree on a plan, any one of them could petition the Tennessee secretary of state to 
appoint a dispute resolution panel of administrative law judges to settle the conflict. 
Once adopted by the July 1, 2001, deadline, a plan could not be amended for three 
years except in extraordinary circumstances.  All counties have adopted a growth plan 
as required by Chapter 1101. 
 
The countywide growth plan identifies three distinct areas in the county: 
 
 Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB)—areas that contain the corporate limits of a 
municipality and the adjoining territory where growth is expected; 
 Planned Growth Areas—areas outside incorporated municipalities where growth 
is expected and where new incorporations may occur; and  
 Rural Areas—territory not within one of the other two categories that is to be 
preserved for agriculture, recreation, forest, wildlife, and uses other than high-
density commercial or residential development.  T.C.A. § 6-58-101. 
 
The three-year period during which growth plans could not be amended except in 
extraordinary circumstances has passed, and growth plan amendment activity has 
occurred in some counties and will likely occur in others. The amendment of 
comprehensive growth plans is accomplished in the same way the original  
comprehensive growth plans were adopted.  A detailed explanation of that process is 
found in Amending Comprehensive Growth Plans, 2005 (see Appendix B), a joint 
CTAS-MTAS publication by David Connor and Dennis Huffer. 
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In addition, it is said in City of Harriman v. Roane County Election Commission, 384 
S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2011), that, “When amending a growth plan, the coordinating 
committee must follow the same procedures used to establish the original growth plan” 
(citing T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)).  [At 697.]  In that case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
had held that in order to annex territory outside its urban growth boundary a municipality 
need only “propose” – but not obtain – an amendment to the growth plan adopted by the 
county (citing T.C.A. § 6-58-111(a).  The Tennessee Supreme Court overturned the 
Court of Appeals, applying the rules of statutory construction to reason that it was the 
intention of the General Assembly that changes in the urban growth boundary require 
the approval of a reconvened coordinating committee as prescribed by the Growth Plan 
Law.  “[O]nly after the amendment procedure may a municipality annex the subject 
territory by ordinance.”  (alternatively, at that time, by referendum).  [At 690-691.] 
 
Other Restrictions on Annexation 
Chapter 1101 also imposed some serious restrictions on annexation. Sections 19 and 
21 increased plans of service requirements on the part of cities annexing territory. 
Under § 24, certain tax revenues generated in annexed territories may go to the county 
for long periods. Section 13 of that act also restricts the incorporation of new cities to 
territory designated in the county growth plan as planned growth areas and requires the 
approval of the county governing body before an incorporation election can be held. It 
also imposes certain tax consequences and other limitations on such incorporations that 
in some cases will be a deterrent to new incorporations on the fringes of existing cities. 
 
Amendments to Comprehensive Growth Plan Law 
The General Assembly has amended the Comprehensive Growth Plan Law contained in 
T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 8 several times.  An amendment to it by Public Acts 2014, 
Chapter 707, § 6, provides that “A municipality may expand its urban growth boundary 
to annex a tract of land without reconvening the coordinating committee or 
approval from the county or any other municipality, if: 
 
(1) The tract is contiguous to a tract of land that has the same owner 
and has already been annexed by the municipality; 
(2) The tract is being provided water and sewer services; and 
(3) The owner of the tract, by notarized petition, consents to being 
included within the urban growth boundaries of the municipality. 
 
Other Restrictions on Annexation By Public Acts 2014, Chapter 7071 
The same act severely restricted the methods of annexation, at least in the short term.  
Under § 1, the following restrictions on annexation by ordinance and by referendum 
apply: 
 From April 15, 2013 through the effective date of the act (April 14, 2014), (a 
period that has passed) no municipalities can annex land used primarily for 
                                
1 See Appendix C, which is a copy of Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707. 
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residential or agricultural purposes on its own initiative.  But if the ordinance does 
not take effect by April 14, 2014 and if the municipality would “suffer substantial 
and demonstrable financial injury” if the ordinance does not become operable 
before that date, the county legislative body, upon a petition filed by the 
municipality by that date, may by a majority vote of its membership, waive the 
restrictions imposed on the ordinance by subdivision(a)(1)(A).  [Subsection 
(a)(1)(A) and (B).] 
 
 From April 15, 2014 through May 15, 2015, municipalities are entirely prohibited 
from extending their corporate limits by annexation by ordinance and by 
referendum, except if: 
 
o The owner or owners of the property give written consent for the 
annexation; or  
o The municipal legislative body shows it “suffers substantial and 
demonstrable financial injury” if the ordinance or resolution does 
not become effective on that date and the county legislative body 
waives the restrictions prescribed above; or 
o The annexation meets the requirements of § 6 of the act, which are 
contained above.  [Subsection (a)(2)(A) and (B).] 
 
 Section 2(a) of the act, amends T.C.A., § 6-51-102 (annexation by ordinance), by 
deleting subsections (a), (c), and (d).  Subsection (2)(b) declares that 
“Subsection (a) of this section prohibits any annexation by ordinance that is not 
both operative and effective prior to May 15, 2015.  Subsection (b), which was 
not repealed, governs the requirement and outline of a plan of services for both 
annexation by ordinance and annexation by referendum. 
 
 Section 4 added language to T.C.A., § 6-51-104(a) (annexation by referendum)  
which prohibits annexation by referendum of property being used primarily for 
agricultural purposes, and provides that such property “shall be annexed only 
with the written consent of the property owner or owners [and] shall not require a 
referendum.” 
 
 Section 5 of the act amended T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1, by providing that 
“any county with a metropolitan form of government may expand its urban 
services district” by any method authorized by its charter, including any method, 
identified by charter reference to the general annexation law, that was applicable 
at the time the charter amendment was approved by referendum under Article XI, 
§ 9, of the Tennessee Constitution and T.C.A., § 7-2-106(c) or § 7-2-108(a) (20).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 TAX AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION 
AS OF 2014 
 
COUNTY ENTITLEMENT TO ANNEXATION DATE REVENUE 
Entitlement Lasts 15 Years  
When a city annexes territory, the county is “held harmless” for 15 years for the loss of 
certain tax revenues that the county was receiving from the territory on the date of its 
annexation: 
 
 Local option sales taxes authorized by T.C.A. § 67-6-702;  
 Wholesale beer taxes authorized by T.C.A. § 57-3-103; and 
 Income tax on dividends authorized by T.C.A. § 67-2-102 (Hall income tax).  
[T.C.A. § 6-51-115.]  
 
“Annexation date revenue” continues to go to the county for 15 years after the 
date of the annexation. The annexing municipality retains any increases in these 
revenues generated in the annexed area. (Note that this does not affect the distribution 
of the first half of the local option sales tax, which continues to go to education funding.) 
If commercial activity in the annexed area decreases due to business closures or 
relocations, a city may petition the Department of Revenue to adjust the payments it 
makes to the county.  T.C.A. § 6-51-115. 
 
Calculating “Annexation Date Revenues” 
Any business annexed into a city that produced either local option sales tax revenue or 
wholesale beer tax revenue is subject to the hold harmless provision for counties. 
Generally, the county is guaranteed the amount of taxes received in the 12 most recent 
months prior to the effective date of the annexation, which is termed the “annexation 
date revenue.” The method of calculation varies, depending on how long the business 
has been paying these taxes. 
 
 If the business paid taxes for the full 12 months preceding the annexation 
date, then the hold harmless figure is the 12-month total. 
 If the business was operating for at least one month but less than 12 
months preceding the annexation date, the county is due 12 times the 
average monthly revenue for the months the business operated. 
 If the business operated for less than one month before, or started 
operations within three months after the annexation date, the county is 
due 12 times the average of the first three full months that the business 
operated. 
 With both wholesale beer taxes and local option sales taxes, the county is 
entitled to this annual amount for 15 years following an annexation. This  
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means that for the first 15 years, the city will receive only the tax receipts 
from the annexed businesses that exceed the county’s hold harmless 
payment, the “annexation date revenue.”  
 
When the amount of the local option sales tax cannot be determined from the sales tax 
returns filed by the businesses in the annexed area, the Tennessee Department of 
Revenue may determine the amount to be distributed for the term of 15 years based on 
the best information available, including information from business tax returns or 
additional information from the businesses involved.  T.C.A. § 6-51-115(b)(3). 
 
To facilitate the proper distribution of the local option sales tax, the city is required to 
notify the state Department of Revenue in advance of the effective date of any 
annexation. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a)(2). 
 
The county is responsible for reporting a list of taxpaying businesses in the annexed 
area to the Department of Revenue. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(d)(1). 
 
The city is responsible for collecting and distributing the wholesale beer tax from 
businesses in the annexed area, which is collected directly by the city from beer 
distributors. The city is required to remit the proper amount to the county annually. 
 
Effective July 1 on distribution of situs based taxes, T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a), provides: 
 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, except 
whenever a municipality extends its boundaries by 
annexation, the county or counties in which the municipality 
is located shall continue to receive the revenue from all state 
and local taxes distributed on the bases of situs of collection, 
generated within the annexed area, until July 1 following the 
annexation unless the annexation takes effect on July 1.  
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a)(1) provides that if the annexation takes effect on July 1, the 
municipality shall begin receiving revenues from such taxes generated in the annexed 
area for the period beginning July 1. 
 
January 1 Tax Date Impact On Annexation Timing 
The timing of annexation is important. An annexation ordinance becomes operational 30 
days after its final passage in the absence of a lawsuit challenging the annexation. An 
annexation by referendum becomes effective 30 days after certification of the election 
results. 
 
Two dates should be kept in mind in planning the effective date of an annexation 
ordinance or referendum, taking into account the 30-day waiting period:  
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1. January 1 is the assessment date for property to be placed on the tax rolls, 
and June 30 is the deadline for qualifying for state shared taxes in the 
ensuing fiscal year. 
 
2. The deadline for certifying a special census is June 30. Time must be allowed 
for taking, holding, and certifying that census. Failure to meet this deadline 
will result in the loss of state shared taxes for the added residents for an 
entire year. 
 
A city can influence the property tax impact on an annexation by scheduling it before or 
after the assessment date of January 1. Before that date, property taxes for that year 
will be payable by property owners in the annexed areas; after that date, property 
owners will not be liable for the property tax until the following year. If a lawsuit against 
an annexation occurs or is expected, the timing of the effective date of the annexation 
may be less significant. Such lawsuits are often characterized by many delays, which 
make that date unpredictable. But in some cases, the city’s agreement to a delay in the 
effective date of the annexation with its corresponding delay in when property taxes 
become due in the annexed property might be helpful in settling the lawsuit in the city’s 
favor. 
 
With respect to annexation by ordinance, cities apparently have the authority to fix the 
“operative” or effective date of an annexation in the ordinance. In Bastnagel v. 
Memphis, 457 S.W.2d 532 (1970), on October 28, 1968, the City of Memphis adopted 
an annexation ordinance on final reading. The ordinance fixed the day the annexation 
would actually take place as December 31, 1969.  On December 15, 1969, the plaintiff 
filed a suit challenging the reasonableness of the annexation. He argued that the 
“operative” date of the annexation under T.C.A. § 6-309-310 [now T.C.A. § 6-51-102-
103] was December 31, 1969, and that he had 30 days before the operative date to 
challenge the ordinance.  The city argued that the “operative” date of the annexation 
under those statutes was 30 days after the final passage of the ordinance on October 
28, 1968.  The court agreed with the city, holding that the challenge to the annexation 
had not been made within 30 days following October 28, 1968. 
 
SPECIAL CENSUS AND STATE SHARED TAXES 
Special Census After Annexation 
In the event any area is annexed to any municipality, the municipality may have a 
special census and in any county having a population of not less than 276,000 nor more 
than 277,000 according to the 1970 or any subsequent federal census, the municipality 
shall have such special census within the annexed area taken by the Federal Bureau of 
the Census or in a manner directed by and satisfactory to the Tennessee Department of 
Economic and Community Development, in which case the population of such 
municipality shall be changed and revised so as to include the population of the 
annexed area as shown by the supplemental census. The population of the municipality 
as so changed and revised shall be its population for the purpose of computing the 
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municipality’s share of all funds and monies distributed by the state of Tennessee 
among the municipalities of the state on a population basis. The population of the 
municipality as so revised shall be used to compute the aggregate population of  
all municipalities of the state, effective on the first day of the next July following the 
certification of the supplemental census results to the commissioner of finance and 
administration.  T.C.A. § 6-51-114. 
 
State Shared Taxes 
The deadline of June 30 to certify a special census of an annexed area in order to 
secure state shared taxes during the ensuing fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) has already 
been mentioned. After an annexation is finally effective, a city should make certain that 
certification is made on time. If time is short, the census could be taken before the final 
effective date so that the results will be available for certification immediately thereafter. 
 
Two agencies can certify a special census: the Federal Bureau of the Census and the 
Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development. The former will 
assume full responsibility for supervising and conducting the census, but the request 
usually must be submitted well in advance of the desired completion date. Full 
information and an estimate of costs must be obtained from the Director of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20333. Upon completion, the city should 
make certain that a copy of the results is sent to the Tennessee Department of 
Economic and Community Development.  The census done by the Tennessee 
Department of Economic and Community Development is required to be done in a 
“manner directed by and satisfactory to” that department.  
 
Instructions and an estimate of costs may be obtained from the Tennessee Department 
of Economic and Community Development, 312 Eighth Avenue North, 10th Floor, 
Nashville, Tennessee 37243. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
 ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM1 
 
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM BY CITY WITHIN ITS UGB 
Generally 
Cities are entitled to annex by referendum under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 105.  
The referendum process begins when a petition of interested persons is presented to 
the city council, or when the council on its own initiative decides to proceed without a 
petition.  A resolution is prepared and adopted by the city governing body that defines 
the area to be annexed and calls for a referendum. 
 
NOTICE AND PUBLIC HEARING ON ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES 
REQUIRED 
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) and (b) contain stringent public notice requirements on both the 
annexation and the plan of services: 
 
 A copy of the annexation resolution describing the territory proposed for 
annexation “shall be promptly sent by the municipality to the last known 
address listed in the office of the property assessor for each property 
owner of record within the territory proposed for annexation.” 
 
 Resolution to be sent by first class mail and be mailed no later than 14 
days prior to the scheduled date of the hearing on the proposed 
annexation. 
 
 A person or persons with personal knowledge of the mailing of resolutions 
to each property owner of record “may” submit a notarized affidavit to the 
presiding officer of the municipality that such resolutions were mailed.  
The failure of a property owner to receive the mailed notice shall not be 
grounds to invalidate the annexation. 
 
 Resolution shall be published by posting copies of it in at least 3 public 
places in the territory to be annexed and in a like number of public places 
in the annexing municipality. 
 
 Resolution shall include a plan of services that “shall” address the same 
services and timing of services as required by T.C.A., § 6-51-102, as 
follows: 
 
                                
1For sample resolutions or ordinances for a call for a referendum on annexation, and resolutions adopting 
plans of services, see Appendix D. 
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o Shall include but not be limited to police protection, water 
service, electrical service, sanitary sewer service, solid 
waste collection, road and street construction and repair, 
recreational facilities and programs, street lighting, and 
zoning services, and if the annexing municipality owns a 
separate school system, the plan shall include schools and 
provisions specifically addressing the impacts, if any, of 
annexation on school attendance zones. 
 
o Reasonable implementation schedule for the delivery of 
comparable services with respect to the services delivered to 
all citizens of the municipality. 
 
 Notice of the time, place and purpose of the public hearing on the plan of 
services shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
municipality not less than 15 days before the hearing. 
 
 Notice of the public hearing on plan of services must include the location 
of a minimum of 3 copies of the plan of services, which the municipality 
shall provide for public inspection during all business hours from the date 
of the notice until the public hearing. 
 
The adopted resolution then must be posted in at least three public places in the 
proposed annexed area and in three places in the existing city, and it must “at about the 
same time” be published in the local newspaper of general circulation (if there is one) in 
both the territory proposed for annexation and in the city. 
 
Between 30 and 60 days after the resolution’s posting and publication, a referendum of 
the voters who live in the area proposed for annexation is held by the county election 
commission. At its own option, the city may also have the referendum include all voters 
within the existing city. 
 
If the referendum receives a majority vote of the residents of the proposed area or, if 
submitted to the city’s voters a majority of those votes as well, the annexation is 
approved and takes effect 30 days after the election commission certifies the results. 
 
Under Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, §1(a)(2)(A) a municipality cannot annex territory 
by either referendum or by ordinance between April 15, 2014 through April 15, 2015. 
 
ANNEXED TERRITORY MUST BE CONTIGUOUS TO EXISTING CITY 
Tennessee’s annexation law does not mention the word “contiguous.”  Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 6-51-102, speaking of annexation by ordinance, says:  “A 
municipality…may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory adjoining its 
existing boundaries….”  Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-104, speaking of 
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annexation by referendum, says, “A municipality…may propose extension of its 
corporate limits by annexation of territory adjoining to its existing boundaries.”  But 
Town of Bartlett v. City of Memphis, 482 S.W.2d 782, and State ex rel. Maury County 
Farmers Co-Op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 210 (1962), declare that the 
annexed territory must be “contiguous,” which points to the proposition that contiguity is 
achieved only if the annexed territory adjoins the existing municipality. 
 
How strictly the Tennessee courts interpret the requirement that annexed territory 
“adjoin” the existing city is seen in Southwest Tennessee Electrical Membership 
Corporation v. City of Jackson, 359 S.W.3d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), and unreported 
Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App.)  In the former, it was held 
that of pieces of property that were contiguous to each other and annexed at the same 
time, only those pieces of property that were contiguous to the existing city at the time 
of the annexation were validly annexed.  In the latter, the court held that where two 
pieces of property were contiguous to each other, but the city annexed one piece of 
property that was contiguous to the city, and several hours later annexed the second 
piece, the first piece of property was not contiguous to the city at the time it annexed the 
second piece, the first annexation ordinance not having become “operative.” 
 
With one exception, Tennessee annexation case law takes up the question of whether 
an annexation is contiguous only in cases of annexation by ordinance.  The exception is 
Smith v. Town of Church Hill, 828 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).  There the court 
observed that: 
 
The Smiths do not challenge the constitutionality of T.C.A.  
§ 6-51-104 or § 6-51-105 (which govern annexation by 
referendum) under which their property was annexed, nor do 
they contend that the Town did not properly follow the 
statutes in the annexation proceedings.  Their sole 
contention relates to a small area where the portion of the 
Smith farm which was annexed in 1986 borders on the west 
bank of the Holston River.  Even though the 126 acres of the 
Smith farm which was taken into the Town in 1986 border on 
and are contiguous with the subdivision together with the 
remaining portion of the Smith Farm, the Smiths contend this 
creates a corridor annexation. 
 
But the court determined that: 
 
A map of the annexed territory shows it begins at the 
corporate limits along the north end of the subdivision near 
the western bank of the Holston River; thence in an easterly 
direction crossing the Holston River to its east bank; thence 
with the meanderings of the east bank of the river in a 
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southeasterly and a northwesterly direction some 16,600 
feet; thence crossing the river to the Town corporate limits; 
encompassing some 1,096 acres all of which has as its inner 
boundary line the corporate boundary line of the Town and 
as its outer boundary line the east bank of the Holston River. 
 All of the property is within one mile of the Town hall. [At 
386.] 
 
The court concluded that the annexed territory was contiguous to the city, made so by 
the connection of the subdivision and the farm by the river bed. 
 
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE AND BY REFERENDUM RESTRAINED WITHOUT 
CONSENT OF PROPERTY OWNERS 
Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 put at least temporary hard brakes on annexation by 
ordinance and annexation by referendum in Tennessee.  Section 1, subsection (a)(2)(A) 
of that act says: 
 
From the effective date of § 1 of this act (April 15, 2014) 
through May 15, 2015, no municipality shall extend its 
corporate limits by means of annexation by ordinance 
pursuant to § 6-51-102, or by resolution [referendum], 
pursuant to § 6-51-104 and 6-51-105; and no annexation 
shall become operative during such period, unless otherwise 
permitted pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), or § 6, 
or unless the owner or owners of the property give written 
consent for the annexation. 
 
That subsection provides two additional narrow methods for annexation by ordinance 
and referendum: 
 
 Subsection (a)(2)(B) provides a narrow loophole for annexations by ordinance 
and by referendum begun prior to the period May 15, 2014 through May 15, 
2015, as follows: 
 
o If prior to the effective date of § 1 of this act (April 15, 2014), a 
municipality formally acted upon an annexation ordinance or 
resolution [referendum] restricted by subdivision (a)(2)(A); and if the 
municipality would suffer substantial and demonstrable financial 
injury if such ordinance or resolution does not become operative 
prior to May 15, 2015; then, upon petition by the municipality 
submitted prior to May 15, 2015, the county legislative body may, 
by a majority vote of its membership waive the restrictions imposed 
on such ordinance or resolution by subsection (a)(2)(A). 
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o Section 6 is probably an even narrower loophole for annexations by 
ordinance or by referendum.  It amends T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 58 
(the Comprehensive Growth Plan Law), which was a product of 
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, as amended, by adding this new 
section: 
 
A municipality may extend its urban growth boundaries to 
annex a tract of land without reconvening the coordinating 
committee or approval from the county or any other 
municipality if: 
 
(1)  The tract is contiguous to a tract of land that has the 
same owner and has already been annexed by the 
municipality; 
(2)  The tract is being provided water and sewer services; 
and 
(3)  The owner of the tract, by notarized petition consents to 
being included within the urban growth boundaries of the 
municipality. 
 
Section 6 appears to apply only to the expansion of the urban growth boundary of a 
municipality.  The purpose of the notarized petition signed by the owner of the tract is 
that he or she “consents to being included within the urban growth boundaries of the 
municipality.”  Consenting to coming within the urban growth boundary of a municipality 
is not the same as being annexed into the municipality.  But that section clearly 
contemplates an annexation of the qualifying tract of land after the expansion of the 
urban growth boundary will legally accommodate it.  It may be wise for a property owner 
desiring to be annexed to also give his written consent to the annexation. 
 
Section 4 provides that: 
 
No such resolution [for annexation by referendum] shall 
propose annexation of any property being used primarily for 
agricultural purposes…[Such property shall be annexed only 
with the written consent of the property owner or owners.]  A 
resolution to effectuate annexation of any property, with 
written consent of the property owner or owners, shall not 
require a referendum. 
 
Annexation by ordinance and by referendum appear to be restrained, at least through 
May 15, 2015, by Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707, section 1(a)(2)(A), which provides 
that: 
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…no municipality shall extend its corporate limits by means 
of annexation by ordinance, pursuant to § 6-51-102, or by 
referendum, pursuant to §§ 6-51-104 and 6-51-105; and no 
annexation shall become operative during such period 
unless otherwise permitted pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(B), 
(a)(2)(B), or § 6, or unless the owner or owners of property 
have given written consent to the annexation.  However, no 
such resolution shall propose annexation of any property 
being used primarily for agricultural purposes…property 
being used [for that purpose] shall be annexed only with the 
written consent of the property owner or owners.”  A 
resolution to effectuate annexation of any property with the 
written consent of the property owners, shall not require a 
referendum.”  
 
The last clause of § 4 may have shifted gears from only agricultural property to all 
property that could otherwise be annexed by referendum. 
  
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS  
Public Notice Before Annexation 
Notice of the annexation, which describes the property to be annexed, must be given in 
the case of annexation by ordinance and by referendum. T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides 
that: 
 
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the municipality at least seven (7) days in 
advance of hearing. The notice, whether by ordinance as 
stipulated in § 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as 
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion of 
a map which includes a general delineation of the area or 
areas to be annexed by use of official road names and/or 
numbers, names of lakes and waterways, or other 
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate. 
 
The detailed form of the notice of the resolution for annexation by referendum is 
prescribed by T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) which is outlined by this Chapter, Notice and Public 
Hearing Required, above. 
 
The same statute also provides that the resolution [calling for an annexation 
referendum] that describes the territory proposed to be annexed shall be published in: 
 
 Three public places in the territory proposed for annexation;  
 Three public places in the city proposing the annexation; and  
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 A newspaper of general circulation (if there is one) in the territory proposed for 
annexation and in the city proposing the annexation.  
 
It also provides that the notice must include a plan of services, which “shall address the 
same services and timing of services as required in T.C.A. § 6-51-101, subsection (b)" 
[which contains the requirements for the content of the plan of services in annexations 
by ordinance].  [See Chapter 6, Plan of Services.] 
 
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation Resolution  
T.C.A. § 6-51-104 requires that the resolution calling for an annexation referendum 
[which includes the plan of services] be forwarded to the county mayor in whose county 
the territory being annexed is located.  The county mayor is required to notify the 
appropriate county department of the information the resolution contains. 
 
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation Certification  
T.C.A. § 6-51-105(d) [annexation by referendum] requires the municipality, upon  
receiving the certification from the election commission, to forward a copy of the 
certification to the county mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located. 
 
Notice to Emergency Communications Districts 
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) requires that the legislative body of the annexing municipality, 
upon the final passage of an annexation ordinance, provide to any affected emergency 
communications district a copy of the portion of the plan of services dealing with 
emergency services and a detailed map designating the annexed area, which must 
contain certain information.  In the case of a contested annexation ordinance where the  
city plans to begin providing emergency services in the annexed territory immediately, 
the municipality must notify the emergency communications district when the 
annexation becomes final. 
 
Arguably, this notice provision does not apply to annexation by referendum. However, it 
would be a legally and practically wise policy for any municipality annexing territory by 
referendum to comply with this notice provision. 
 
Effect of Failure to Notify Emergency Communications Districts  
T.C.A. § 6-51-119 provides that compliance or noncompliance with this provision is not 
admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., Title 6 
[presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to annexation], Title 
29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which challenges against 
annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the annexation would be 
brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency communications district 
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability Act]. 
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Notice to County Election Commission/s 
T.C.A. § 2-2-107 requires that in order to timely correct voter registration records, 
municipalities that have annexed territory shall send to the county election commission 
or commissions affected by an annexation: 
 
 Maps depicting the area annexed; 
 Copy of the annexation ordinance (or resolution), denoting, if applicable, which 
wards or districts the annexed area will be a part of; and 
 A copy of the census taken for the annexation, if available, with names and 
addresses within the annexed area. 
 
NOTICE TO SCHOOL SYSTEMS 
If the municipality does not maintain a separate school system, the municipality must 
provide written notice of the annexation to all affected school systems as soon as 
practicable, but in no event, not less than 30 days prior to the public hearing which must 
be the same as the public hearing on the annexation.  
 
PLAN OF SERVICE REQUIRED  
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1), requires that the governing body of the annexing municipality 
to adopt a plan of services for the territory to be annexed by referendum.  [See detailed 
notice and public hearing, as well as contents of plan of service requirements, in Notice 
and Public Hearing Requirements above.] 
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-104 requires the annexation resolution [which must include the plan of 
services] to be sent to the county mayor before the annexation.  [See Chapter 6, Plan of 
Services.]  
  
CHALLENGING ANNEXATIONS BY REFERENDUM 
Annexations by ordinance were subject to challenge by quo warranto, and in rare cases 
by declaratory judgment.  However, Tennessee’s annexation law makes no provision for 
court review of an annexation accomplished by referendum.  It is said in Vicars v. 
Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), that absent some claim of 
constitutional infirmities in the annexation, it is not subject to judicial review and that no 
equal protection or due process argument can be made when the statute is properly 
followed.  The court also said that adjusting the boundaries of the territory proposed for 
annexation to help the annexation receive a favorable vote in the referendum was not a 
constitutional infirmity. 
 
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Committee To Oppose Annexation v. City of 
Alcoa, 881 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1994), limited the extent to which a city could adjust the 
boundaries of the territory to help ensure a favorable vote in the annexation referendum. 
 Under T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) the “qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for 
annexation” are entitled to vote in the referendum. The court held that “residency” within 
the meaning of that statute was not restricted to those whose dwelling houses were 
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located on the property proposed for annexation but to those whose curtilage extended 
into that property. The difference was an undetermined, but undoubtedly significant, 
number of voters qualified to vote in the referendum.  The court did not mention what 
constitutional entitlements might be involved in the denial of the property owners who 
resided in the proposed annexation area to vote on the annexation.  But the court 
concluded they were “disenfranchised” under the state’s electoral laws. 
 
But challenges to annexations by referendum that do not comply with the law governing 
such annexations may be subject to challenge under the Declaratory Judgments Act for 
being ultra vires under the reasoning of Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 
297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009).  That case analyzed annexation by ordinance and 
cleared up the question of when they could be challenged under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act as opposed to quo warranto actions.  But language in that case may be 
broad enough to encompass annexations by referendum that do not follow the state law 
governing such annexations.  [See Chapter 10, Problem Annexations.] 
 
Note that in Smith v. Town of Church Hill, 828 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) the 
court observed that the plaintiffs did not allege any constitutional or state law violations 
in the annexation at issue.  [See this chapter, Annexed Territory must be Contiguous to 
Existing City.] 
 
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM OUTSIDE THE CITY’S UGB  
Generally Prohibited 
Before January 1, 2006, a city could annex territory outside its UGB in either of two 
ways: 
 
 By obtaining approval of an amendment to its UGB in the same way that 
the original growth plan was established; or 
 By referendum under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 105.  T.C.A. § 6-51-111(d). 
 
T.C.A. § 6-58-111(c)(2) gives municipalities the exclusive authority to annex territory 
within their UGBs, but provides that “a municipality may annex within a county’s planned 
growth area or rural area, but the annexation must be by referendum only and not by 
ordinance.” 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE1 
 
THE TWILIGHT OF ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE 
One Tennessee court recently observed that, “Annexation by ordinance is in its twilight.” 
 Unreported Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App).  [At 5.]  That is 
likely a correct observation.  If that is so, much, if not most, of this chapter, and other 
provisions in Annexation Handbook III dealing with annexation by ordinance, may soon 
be obsolete.  However, because some annexation by ordinance activity is still ongoing 
and because there may be challenges to any annexation ordinances resulting from that 
activity, some of these provisions may still be temporarily useful.  In all events, much of 
the law that formerly applied only to annexations by ordinance also applies to 
annexation by referendum. 
 
ANNEXED TERRITORY MUST BE CONTIGUOUS TO EXISTING CITY 
Tennessee’s annexation law does not mention the word “contiguous.”  Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 6-51-102, speaking of annexation by ordinance, says:  “A 
municipality…may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory adjoining its 
existing boundaries….”  Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-104, speaking of 
annexation by referendum, says, “A municipality…may propose extension of its 
corporate limits by annexation of territory adjoining to its existing boundaries.”  But 
Town of Bartlett v. City of Memphis, 482 S.W.2d 782 (1972), and State ex rel. Maury 
County Farmers Co-Op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 210 (1962), declare that 
the annexed territory must be “contiguous,” which points to the proposition that 
contiguity is achieved only if the annexed territory adjoins the existing municipality. 
 
How strictly the Tennessee courts interpret the requirement that annexed territory 
“adjoin” the existing city is seen in Southwest Tennessee Electrical Membership 
Corporation v. City of Jackson, 359 S.W.3d 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010), and unreported 
Garrett v. City of Norris, 2014 WL 4260848 (Tenn. Ct. App.)  In the former, it was held 
that of pieces of property that were contiguous to each other and annexed at the same 
time, only those pieces of property that were contiguous to the existing city at the time 
of the annexation were validly annexed.  In the latter, the court held that where two 
pieces of property were contiguous to each other, but the city annexed one piece of 
property that was contiguous to the city, and several hours later annexed the second 
piece, the first piece of property was not contiguous to the city at the time it annexed the 
second piece, the first annexation ordinance not having become “operative.” 
 
                                
1For sample annexation ordinances and plans of services, see Appendix E. 
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NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
Pre-Annexation Public Notice  
Notice of the annexation, which describes the property to be annexed, must be given in 
the case of annexation by ordinance [and by referendum].  T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides 
that: 
 
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the municipality at least seven (7) days in 
advance of hearing. The notice, whether by ordinance as 
stipulated in § 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as 
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion of 
a map which includes a general delineation of the area or 
areas to be annexed by use of official road names and/or 
numbers, names of lakes and waterways, or other 
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate. 
 
Notice to County Mayor of Annexation 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) provides that during the 30-day period following final passage of 
the annexation ordinance during which the ordinance is not operative, the municipality 
must notify the county mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located of 
the annexation. The notification must include a copy of the annexation ordinance and a 
map of the area being annexed. 
 
Notice to Emergency Communications Districts 
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) requires that upon the final passage of an annexation ordinance 
the legislative body of the annexing municipality must provide to any affected 
emergency communications district a copy of the portion of the plan of services dealing 
with emergency services and a detailed map designating the annexed area. The map 
must identify all public and private streets, including street names and direction 
indicators, in the annexed area. The map must also include or have appended a list of 
address ranges for each street in the annexed area. For contested annexation 
ordinances, in cases in which the municipality plans to begin providing emergency 
services in the annexed territory immediately, the municipality must notify the 
emergency communications district when the annexation becomes final. 
 
However, T.C.A. § 6-51-119, provides that compliance or noncompliance with this 
provision is not admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A. 
Title 6 [presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to 
annexation], Title 29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which 
challenges against annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the 
annexation would be brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency 
communications district under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability 
Act]. 
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Notice to County Election Commission/s 
T.C.A. § 2-2-107 requires that in order to timely correct voter registration records, 
municipalities that have annexed territory shall send to the county election commission 
or commissions affected by an annexation: 
 
 Maps depicting the area annexed; 
 Copy of the annexation ordinance, denoting, if applicable, which wards or 
districts the annexed area will be a part of; and 
 A copy of the census taken for the annexation, if available, with names and 
addresses within the annexed area. 
 
Notice to County Mayor of Lawsuits and Final Judgments  
T.C.A. § 6-51-103 requires the municipality to notify the county mayor of: 
 
 The municipality’s appeal of a decision in a quo warranto suit; and 
 The outcome of litigation in a quo warranto suit contesting a proposed 
annexation. 
 
Note that this statute does not require notice to the county mayor of appeals and 
outcomes of non-quo warranto annexation suits. 
 
Similar notice provisions apply to the plan of services.  [See Chapter 6, Plan of 
Services.] 
 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN ANNEXED TERRITORY 
Residents of an annexed area must be accorded all the: 
 
Rights and privileges of citizenship, in accordance with the 
provisions of the annexing municipality’s charter, 
immediately upon annexation as though such annexed 
territory had always been a part of the annexing municipality. 
It is the duty of the governing body to put into effect with 
respect to the annexed area any charter provisions relating 
to representation on the governing body.  T.C.A. § 6-51-
108(a).  
 
In City of Knoxville v. Graves, 341 S.W.2d 718 (1960), an annexation ordinance was 
attacked because it did not contain any provision for implementing this requirement. The 
court could find nothing in the statute to warrant a construction “that the ordinance must 
contain, as a condition precedent to its validity, a provision setting up such rights,” and 
concluded that “it is enough if the rights of the citizens of that area are provided for by 
ordinance, as may be done, when the annexation becomes effective. Certainly we 
cannot declare the ordinance void on the assumption that the City Council will not do 
their duty.  The presumption is that they will do it.”  [At 720.]  The court reiterated its 
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view on this point in Hardison v. City of Columbia, 360 S.W.2d 39 (1962), and Maury 
County Farmers Co-op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962). In Cope v. 
Mayor of Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 798 (1966), the court refused to invalidate an 
annexation ordinance based on the ground that the city’s governing body would be 
powerless to change wards established by private act of the General Assembly for 
election of its members. 
 
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE WITHIN THE UGB 
Generally  
Cities in Tennessee may, upon their own initiative or when petitioned by a majority of 
the residents and property owners in an area, annex territory by ordinance within their 
UGBs. Passage of an annexation ordinance must be preceded by a seven-day advance 
notice of a public hearing. The actual schedule for final passage will depend on the  
requirements for preparation and consideration of a plan of services for the annexed 
territory that are outlined in Chapter 6, Plan of Services. The ordinance does not take 
effect until 30 days after its final passage.  T.C.A. § 6-51-102.  
 
Annexation by a City in More Than One County (T.C.A. § 6-58-108(e))  
A city may annex by ordinance upon its own initiative only territory within the county in 
which the city hall is located. There are three main exceptions: 
 
 A municipality located in two or more counties as of November 25, 1997, 
may annex in all such counties unless the percentage of the city 
population residing in the county or counties other than the one in which 
the city hall is located is less than 7 percent of the total population of the 
municipality; or 
 A municipality may annex in the second county if the legislative body of 
the county in which the territory proposed for annexation is located 
approves the annexation by resolution; or 
 The city may annex in any county in which, on January 1, 1998, it 
provided sanitary sewer service to 100 or more residential and/or 
commercial customers. 
 
These restrictions do not apply to annexation by referendum.  Any annexation must also 
conform to the provisions of the growth plans in both counties. 
 
Annexation of “Substantial” Industrial Property  
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f), provides that: 
 
Should the territory hereafter sought to be annexed be the 
site of substantial industrial plant development, a fact to be 
ascertained by the court, the municipality shall have the 
burden of proving that the annexation of the site...is not 
unreasonable in consideration of the factors above 
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mentioned, including the necessity for or use of municipal 
services by the industrial plant or plants, and the present 
ability and intent of the municipality to benefit the industrial 
plant development by rendering municipal services thereto 
when and as needed. The policy and purpose of this 
provision is to prevent the annexation of industrial plants for 
the sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue, without 
the ability and intent to benefit the areas annexed by  
rendering municipal services, when and as needed, and 
when such services are not used or required by the industrial 
plants. 
  
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978), 
declared that T.C.A. § 6-51-103(e) applied only when an industrial site was being 
annexed by a city; it did not apply to an 85-acre industrial site that was part of the 
annexation of 806 acres. 
 
Annexation of State Park Land  
T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1, requires the following as a precedent to municipal 
annexation of any state park land: 
 
 The territory proposed for annexation must be located within the municipality’s 
urban growth boundaries; 
 The municipality must provide detailed notice to the commissioner of 
environment and conservation; 
 Notification must include a detailed description of the territory proposed for 
annexation, reasons for the annexation, plan for municipal services and timeline 
for delivery; 
 The department must study the likely impact on the wildlife, scenery, ambiance, 
traffic, roads, visitors and mission of the proposed territory to be annexed.  
Municipality must pay the costs of this study; 
 The department must conduct one or more public hearings; 
 Prior to the public hearing, the department must seek the county commission’s 
input regarding the municipality’s proposed annexation; 
 The department must report its finding and may prescribe binding prerequisites 
for the proposed annexation as are necessary and desirable to protect and 
preserve the park or natural area for the benefit of all current and future 
Tennesseans. 
 
TRIAL AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
Challenges based on “reasonableness” of the annexation ordinance 
The following rules govern quo warranto challenges to the reasonableness of 
annexations by ordinance within the UGB, under T.C.A. § 6-51-103: 
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 Jury trial generally: Chancellor or circuit court judge without a jury tries 
cases. 
 Burden of proof generally: Burden is on the plaintiff to prove: 
o That the annexation is “...unreasonable for the overall well-being of the 
communities involved,” or 
o That “the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of 
the municipality and [the annexed] territory will not be materially retarded 
in the absence of such annexation.”  T.C.A. § 6-58-111. 
 
Presumably, T.C.A. § 6-58-111, by implication, repeals the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 6-51-
103(a)(1)(A), 6-51-103(c) and 6-51-103(e), which put the burden of proving an 
annexation ordinance reasonable on the city. 
 
The question whether the burdens of proof contained in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 are 
alternative ones was addressed in State ex rel. Tipton v. City of Knoxville, 205 S.W.3d 
456 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal by Tenn. Supreme Ct. denied (Oct. 2, 2006).  There 
the city attempted to annex a single piece of commercial property that was already 
surrounded by the city (a hole in the donut).  The annexation would have taken in the 
hole.  
 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the city’s annexation of the territory in 
question, concluding that the plaintiff had not carried the burden of proof that the 
“health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and 
territory will not be materially retarded in the absence of such annexation.”  It reasoned 
that:  
 
1.  The “or” in the alternative burden of proof set forth in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 was 
not ambiguous, that it was intended by the General Assembly to actually 
reflect alternative burdens of proof, and that a person contesting an 
annexation could win the contest by carrying only one of the alternative 
burdens of proof. 
2. Whether annexation is materially beneficial to the affected territory depends 
not only upon what services the municipality will provide after annexation 
but also upon the services the municipality already provides to the affected 
territory.  The fact that an affected territory already receives municipal 
services demonstrates that the affected territory benefits from those 
services and that the welfare of the property owners in the affected territory 
is enhanced by those services.  [Emphasis is mine.]  Bowevil Express, LLC 
v. City of Henderson, No. W1999-02137-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 204211, at 
5 (Tenn. Ct. App.); see also Cox v. City of Jackson, No. 01A01-9701-CH-
00001, 1997 WL 777078, at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App.)  [At 7.]  
3. The territory will receive improved services after the annexation. 
4.  “After annexation, the city would be able to guarantee harmonious land uses 
throughout the area surrounding the Territory.  In addition, the city will be 
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able to better respond to emergencies in that area.  Based on these facts, 
the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the city would materially 
benefit from the annexation.” 
 
In summary, said the court: 
 
...the preponderance of the evidence shows that (1) the 
Territory currently, materially benefits from services provided 
by the City, (2) the Territory would materially benefit from the 
additional post-annexation services which the City would 
provide, and (3) the City will materially benefit from the 
annexation.  If the Territory and the City will materially 
benefit from the annexation, then it follows that the failure to 
annex the Territory would materially retard the health, safety, 
and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the City 
and Territory.  See State ex rel. Wood v. City of Memphis, 
510 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tenn. 1974); Mulrooney v. Town of 
Collierville, No. W1999-04474-COA-Re-CV, 2000 WL 
34411151, at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App.)  [At 9-10.] 
 
The facts in State v. Tipton are peculiar, involving a large Tennessee city entirely 
surrounding a small piece of property on a busy highway running through it.  But a 
positive side of this case is that it stands for the general proposition that where a 
municipality already provides a wide range of services to territory proposed for 
annexation, the plaintiff will not be able to successfully argue that the health, safety and 
welfare of the territory will not be retarded if it is not annexed because it does not need 
municipal services.  It also points to the proposition that annexations that clearly 
materially benefit both the city and the territory proposed for annexation would 
strengthen a city’s hand in an annexation contest. 
 
Challenges to the Ordinance Based on Constitutional Grounds 
Under State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998), it appears 
that suits alleging an annexation is unconstitutional or ultra vires can be brought under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act found in T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq., in narrow 
circumstances.  (See Highwood Properties, Inc., v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.2d 1095 
(Tenn. 2009) and Chapter 10 Problem Annexations.) 
 
It is said in Bristol v. Earhart, above, that: 
 
But where the quo warranto proceeding is not available 
alternative equitable remedies are not barred.  “[W]here the 
remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that 
there is no concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of  
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statutory provision.  But if quo warranto is not an adequate 
remedy, it will not be a bar to alternative remedies.”  65 Am 
Jur. 2d Quo Warranto § 7 (1972).  [At 952.] 
 
The availability of other remedies drew a line around Declaratory Judgment Act suits in 
annexation cases.  That case pointed to two conditions that it had imposed on such 
suits: 
 
First, we permitted only challenges to ultra vires acts, that is, 
tests of “[t]he validity of an annexation ordinance alleged to 
exceed the authority delegated by the legislature.”  Earhart, 
970 S.E.2d at 954.  Second, we stated that it is only “where 
the quo warranto proceedings is not available, [that] 
alternative equitable remedies are not barred.”  Id.  At 952 
(citing 65 Am.Jur.2d Quo Warranto § 7 (1972)) (“Where the 
remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually held that 
there is no concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of 
statutory provision.”)  [Emphasis added (by court).]  [At 10.]  
 
Highwoods emphasized that Bristol v. Earhart involved a case where the absence of 
people in the annexed area meant that there could be no plaintiffs:  No plaintiffs, no 
case, no case, no remedies for an ultra vires annexation. 
 
In Allen v. City of Memphis, 397 S.W.3d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), which involved an 
action for a declaratory judgment, based on open meetings violations, the court citing 
Bristol and Highwoods, declared that: 
 
[T]he specific deficiencies alleged by Appellants to support 
an invalidation of Ordinance 4321 are unclear.  But, 
Appellants’ claims unquestionably relate to alleged errors in 
the annexation hearings.  In the past, our Supreme Court 
has determined that errors in notice, public hearings and 
plans of service fall within the ambit of “procedural defects[,]” 
Southwest Tenn. Elec. Mem., Corp., 359 S.W.3d at 604 
(citing City of Watauga, 589 S.W.2d at 905) and “courts have 
no power to vacate an annexation ordinance for purely 
procedural defects.”  City of Watauga, 589 S.W.2d at 906.  
Because the Appellants do not allege that Ordinance 4321 
adopted by the City Council “exceeded the authority 
delegated by the legislature,” and the grounds raised for 
invalidating Ordinance 4321 are properly classified as 
“procedural defects.”  Appellants were required to challenge 
the Ordinance 4321 through the quo warranto procedure.  
[At 581.] 
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WHO MAY CHALLENGE ANNEXATIONS BY ORDINANCE? 
“Aggrieved Owners of Property”  
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A) any “aggrieved owners of property” that borders on or 
lies within the territory annexed have 30 days to challenge an annexation. Notwith-
standing the statutory language that gives abutting landowners the right to challenge an 
annexation, State ex. rel. Cordova Area Residents for the Environment v. City of 
Memphis, 862 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. App.1992), held that part of the statute 
unconstitutional.  For that reason, only the owners of property that lies within the 
territory proposed for annexation have standing to challenge the annexation. 
 
An aggrieved owner of property challenging an annexation loses his cause of action 
upon his transfer of ownership of the property.  McNamee v. City of Knoxville, 824 
S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
  
A county that owned a mere easement in county roads in the territory sought to be 
annexed was not an “aggrieved owner of property” within the meaning of T.C.A. § 6-51-
103(a)(2)(A), held State ex rel. Kessel v. Ashe, 888 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1994). In that 
case, the county admitted that it did not own the fee to its roads.  The court 
distinguished Spoone v. Mayor of Morristown, 431 S.W.2d 827 (1968), in which the 
court had earlier held that a county that owned the roads and a school in the area 
proposed for annexation was an aggrieved owner of property.  The county’s interest in 
the roads in that case was not clear, and the question was whether a legal person as 
well as a natural person could qualify as an “owner of property” under T.C.A. § 6-51-
103(a)(2)(A).  
 
TIME FOR CHALLENGING ANNEXATIONS BY ORDINANCE 
Quo Warranto Challenges  
An annexation ordinance becomes effective 30 days after its final passage. T.C.A.  
§ 6-51-102(a)(1).  An “aggrieved owner of property” lying within the annexed territory 
can, prior to the operative date of the annexation, file a quo warranto suit to contest the 
reasonableness of the annexation in accordance with T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1, 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103 and T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 35.  T.C.A. § 6-51-103 says: 
 
After 30 days have passed, a quo warranto suit against the 
annexation is not subject to judicial review and cannot be 
filed.  [Bastnagel v. Memphis, 457 S.W.2d 532 (1970); City 
of Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 
1978).]  In the unreported case of Coleman v. City of 
Memphis, 2001 WL 1381277 (Tenn. Ct. App.), the court also 
held that a quo warranto suit filed by the plaintiff was not 
filed within 30 days when on August 1, 1995, the city council 
passed the annexation ordinance on third and final reading; 
on August 15, 1995, a motion to reconsider the ordinance 
passed; on August 29, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a quo 
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warranto suit to which they attached the annexation 
ordinance adopted by the city on August 1, 1995.  The 
ordinance underwent significant changes between August 15 
and the date of its final passage on September 19, 1995.  
 
“For this reason,” concluded the court, “it is apparent that 
when Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 29, 1995, they were 
not ‘aggrieved property owners’ as the ordinance was still 
being debated and amended throughout the city’s legislative 
process.”  [At 5.] 
 
The right to commence a new action within one year from 
the date of a voluntary nonsuit under T.C.A. § 28-1-105 does 
not apply to quo warranto suits against annexation 
ordinances.  [Brent v. Town of Greeneville, 309 S.W.2d 121 
(1958).] 
 
CHALLENGES BY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Constitutional challenges and challenges reflecting ultra vires annexations are not 
subject to the 30-day limit contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1).  [State ex rel. Earhart v. 
City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998).]  For an analysis of Earhart and other 
cases that have interpreted that case, see above and Chapter 9, Problem Annexations. 
 
LAWSUIT VENUE 
A suit contesting an annexation of territory in a county other than the one in which the 
municipality's city hall is located shall be filed in the county where the city hall is located. 
The chancellor must then change the venue to a county adjacent to either the county 
where the city hall is located or the county where the proposed annexed territory is 
located.  T.C.A. § 6-51-103(g).  
  
ABANDONMENT AND REPEAL OF ANNEXATION PROCEEDINGS 
T.C.A. § 6-51-106 provides that “Any annexation proceedings initiated under § 6-51-102 
or § 6-51-104 may be abandoned and discontinued at any time by resolution of the 
governing body of the municipality.”  This statute applies only where the annexation has 
been “initiated” but not finally passed.  However, an annexation ordinance finally passed 
can be repealed even after it has been challenged, provided the repeal has been done 
by ordinance (not by motion or resolution).  The repeal of an annexation ordinance 
renders the ordinance moot.  Lee v. City of Chattanooga, 500 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); City of Bluff City v. Morrell, 764 S.W.2d 
200 (Tenn. 1988); Schaltenbrand v. City of Knoxville, 788 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
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LIMITATION ON FUTURE ANNEXATION IF ANNEXATION ORDINANCE HELD 
UNREASONABLE 
If the court finds that the annexation ordinance is unreasonable or has been done by the 
exercise of powers not conferred by law it “shall” issue an order vacating the ordinance, 
and the city shall be prohibited from annexing any part of the territory proposed for 
annexation by the vacated ordinance for a period of at least 24 months following the 
date of the order.  If the court finds the ordinance reasonable, it is operative 31 days 
after the judgment unless an appeal has been taken.  A similar rule applies to 
judgments on the appeal of the annexation ordinance, except that if the ordinance is 
upheld it is operative “forthwith by court order.”  T.C.A. § 6-51-103(c).  In the unreported 
case of Cathey v. City of Dickson, 2002 WL 970429 (Tenn. Ct. App.), it was held that 
the 24-month ban does not apply to annexation ordinances that have been repealed; 
the repeal does not reflect an admission by the city that the ordinance was 
unreasonable. 
 
PLAN OF SERVICES 
A city annexing territory by ordinance or by referendum, must adopt a plan of services 
that outlines the services to be provided in the territory proposed for annexation and the 
timing of those services.  [See Chapter 6, Plan of Services.] 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 PLAN OF SERVICES1 
 
ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE 
Plan of Service Required 
Under Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, a city annexing territory by ordinance was 
required to adopt a plan of services that outlined the services to be provided to the 
annexed area and the timing of those services. Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, 
amended T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) to require that a plan of services be adopted for 
annexations by referendum.  [See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum.] 
 
Effective Date of Plan of Services Requirement 
For an annexation ordinance that was not final on November 25, 1997, where the city 
had not prepared a plan of services, it had 60 days to prepare one. [Chapter 1101, § 20; 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(2).] Presumably, such a plan of services must have met the same 
reasonableness standard as to the scope and implementation schedule as prescribed 
by T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b) for annexations accomplished by cities after the effective date 
of Chapter 1101 (May 19, 1998).  [See Plan of Services Must be Reasonable, 
immediately below.] 
 
Plan of Services Must Be Reasonable  
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-102 [annexation by ordinance] the plan of services must be 
“reasonable” with respect to both the scope of services and to the implementation 
schedule. The implementation schedule must provide for delivery of services in the new 
territory that are comparable to those provided to all citizens of the city. The plan must 
address the following services, whether or not the city currently provides those services: 
 
   Police and fire protection;  
   Water, electrical, and sanitary services; 
   Road and street construction and repair; 
   Recreational facilities and programs;  
   Street lighting; and 
   Zoning services. 
 
The plan may exclude services that are provided by another public or private agency 
other than those services provided by the county. The city may include services in 
addition to those required to be addressed. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b). 
 
                                
1For sample resolutions on plans of services, see Appendices D and E. 
2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 36 
 
Submission of Plan of Services to Planning Commission 
Before its adoption, the plan of services must be submitted to the planning commission 
(if the city has one), which must issue a written report on it within 90 days. (The 90-day 
deadline can be extended by the city governing body by resolution if it chooses to do 
so.) In an unpublished opinion, New Providence Utility District v. Clarksville, filed 
November 14, 1966, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered an objection that 
“approval of the plan of services by the Planning Commission by a resolution, and a 
certified copy of such resolution” did not comply with the statutory requirement “that a 
written report of the Commission’s study of the plan be furnished the City.” In rejecting 
this contention the court said: 
 
The submission of the plan of services to the Planning 
Commission and its report to the legislative body of the 
municipality is part of the legislative process. The form and 
sufficiency of the report is a matter for determination by the 
legislative body and not the courts. The Planning 
Commission had the alternative of approving, modifying or 
rejecting the plan of services submitted to it for study. That 
body adopted the resolution approving the plan and so 
reported to the City Council by a certified copy of the 
resolution. There is nothing in the statute that requires the 
Planning Commission to report to the City Council its 
findings in any particular form. 
 
Public Notice and Hearing on Plan of Services 
The city’s governing body is required to hold a public hearing on the plan after giving 15 
days notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the city. The notice must include at 
least three locations where copies of the plan are available for public inspection. T.C.A. 
§ 6-51-102(b). 
 
Notice of Plan of Services to County Mayor  
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amended T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1) [annexation by 
ordinance] and T.C.A. § 6-51-104 [annexation by referendum] to require that after a 
plan of services is adopted, the municipality shall forward a copy of it to the county 
mayor in whose county the territory being annexed is located. 
  
Notice of Plan of Services to Emergency Communications Districts 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) to require that upon the 
final passage of an annexation ordinance the legislative body of the annexing 
municipality provide to any affected emergency communications district a copy of the 
portion of the plan of services dealing with emergency services and a detailed map 
designating the annexed area. The map must identify all public and private streets, 
including street names and direction indicators, in the annexed area. The map must 
also include or have appended a list of address ranges for each street in the annexed 
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area. For contested annexation ordinances, in cases in which the municipality plans to  
begin providing emergency services in the annexed territory immediately, the 
municipality must notify the emergency communications district when the annexation 
becomes final. 
 
The notification must be sent by certified return receipt mail or any other method that 
assures receipt by the district. 
 
Section 6-51-119 provides that compliance or noncompliance with this provision is not 
admissible against the municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., Title 6 
[presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation and challenges to annexation], Title 
29, Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which challenges against 
annexations upon grounds other than the reasonableness of the annexation would be 
brought], or against the municipality or any affected emergency communications district 
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort Liability Act]. 
 
For similar notice provisions that apply to annexations by ordinance, see Chapter 5, 
Annexation by Ordinance.  For similar notice provisions that apply to annexations by 
referendum, see Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum. 
 
ANNEXATION PROHIBITED IF CITY IS IN “DEFAULT” ON PRIOR PLAN/S OF 
SERVICE 
A city cannot annex “any other territory” under T.C.A. § 6-51-102 “if the municipality is in 
default on any prior plan of services.”  It was widely reasoned that limitation applied only 
to annexations that were not final on November 25, 1997, and forward from that date.  
Chapter 1101, §§ 19 and 20; T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a) and (b)(5);  T.C.A. § 6-51-108(b).  
But in unreported State ex rel Cain v. City of Church Hill, Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4415579 
(Tenn. Ct. App.), it was declared that T.C.A. § 6-51-108 could be applied retroactively.  
This case arose on appeal by the city from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs who argued that under T.C.A. § 6-51-108, they were entitled to sewer 
service with respect to the city’s annexation of their property and its plan of services 
dated in 1988.  The trial court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the city to extend 
sewer service to the plaintiff’s property within 16 months.  The city had unsuccessfully 
argued that T.C.A. § 6-51-108 should not be applied retroactively and that the plan of 
services had provided that, “A sanitary sewer system will be provided as soon as 
economically feasible.  A study will have to be conducted to determine the cost.”  [At 2.] 
 
The Court vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
But on the question of whether T.C.A. § 6-51-108 should be applied retroactively, the 
Court said: 
 
…The City argues that the general presumption against 
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applying laws retroactively, see, generally Nutt v. Champion 
Intern, Corp. 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998), should 
prevent retroactive application here, since, as the trial court 
put it, [t]he legislature has not given us any guidance as to 
how they intended it to apply; where they intended it to be 
applicable and how that was to work.”  However, as the 
plaintiff correctly points out, this presumption is reversed “for 
statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature.  Such 
statutes apply retrospectively … unless the legislature 
indicates a contrary intention or immediate application would 
produce an unjust result.”  Kee v. Shelter Ins., 852 S.W.2d 
226, 228 (Tenn. 1993).  The right to enforce a plan of 
services via mandamus under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-
108(d) is clearly a remedial right, and we think the statute as 
a whole is essentially “remedial or procedural” in nature.  We 
also see no reason to conclude that the retroactive 
application in this case “would produce an unjust result.”  
Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is applicable in this 
case.  [At 6.] 
 
This part of the Court’s decision appears to potentially put the sewer service parts of 
plans of services adopted in connection with annexations that pre-date November 25, 
1997 on the judicial firing line. 
 
But the Court had a problem with the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to summary judgement: 
 
Because the plan of services makes only a conditional 
promise of sewer service-conditioned upon economic 
feasibility-a proper grant of summary judgement for the 
plaintiffs would necessarily require a finding that there was 
no disputed issue of material fact regarding the economic 
feasibility of the sewer service.  Yet no such finding was ever 
made…. [At 7.] 
 
The Court pointed out that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the city over whether 
the sewer extension to the plaintiff’s property was economically feasible was “hotly 
disputed.”  For that reason, declared the Court, “The plaintiff’s simply did not 
demonstrate for summary judgment purposes, that they were entitled to a ‘judgement 
on the papers’.”  [At 7.] 
 
The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to apply an “implied contract theory of the 
recovery”: 
Much ink has been spilled, by both sides, regarding matters 
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that relate only to the implied contract theory:  what 
statements were, or were not, made by which city officials; 
what actions the city council took, or did not take; whether 
the completion of the sewer line constitutes only a ministerial 
act, because of prior city council resolution, or whether it 
remains a discretionary act; and so forth.  [At 7.] 
 
None of those issues related to the sole question of whether the plaintiffs were entitled 
to summary judgment.  But it is reasonable to speculate that the theories of economic 
feasibility of the sewer extension to the annexed property, and of implied contracts, not 
to mention other possible theories, for requiring cities to provide sewer service to 
annexed property under plans of service that date prior to November 25, 1997 will be 
raised again. 
 
It is not clear whether a plaintiff could bring a quo warranto challenge to an annexation 
by ordinance on the ground that it is unreasonable because the city is in default on a 
plan of services from a previous annexation. But, presumably, such a challenge could 
be brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act found at T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq. on 
the ground that the annexation violates the annexation statute. [See Chapter 5, 
Annexation by Ordinance, Challenges to the Ordinance Based on Constitutional and 
Other Grounds, and Chapter 9, Problem Annexations.] 
 
CHALLENGING A PLAN OF SERVICES 
It does not appear that T.C.A. § 6-51-102 or § 6-51-108 give property owners the right 
to challenge the reasonableness of a plan of services separate from their individual 
rights to challenge the annexation ordinance based upon their status as property 
owners in the annexed territory.  However, arguably, property owners have the right to 
challenge the reasonableness of the annexation; presumably they can argue that the 
annexation is unreasonable on the ground that the plan of services is unreasonable or 
that the territory in question does not need the services contained in the plan of 
services. [Chapter 1101, § 20; T.C.A. § 6-51-102; T.C.A. § 6-51-103.  See Chapter 5, 
Annexation by Ordinance, Trial and Burden of Proof.]  But that may not be true, given 
that a remedy for enforcing the plan of services is prescribed by the annexation law.  
[See Enforcing the Plan of Services, immediately below.] 
 
ENFORCING THE PLAN OF SERVICES 
A property owner subject to the plan of services can sue the city to enforce the plan of 
services 180 days following the date the annexation ordinance becomes effective. That 
right to sue is extinguished when the plan of services is fulfilled. [T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d).] 
 
If the court finds that the city has “materially and substantially” failed to comply with its 
plan of services, the city must be given the opportunity to show cause for the failure. If 
the court determines that the failure is due to natural disaster, act of war, terrorism, or 
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reasonably unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the city that materially and 
substantially impeded its ability to carry out the plan of services, the court can alter the 
timetable of the plan. But if the court finds that the city’s failure to comply with the plan 
of services is none of those reasons, it “shall”: 
 
 Issue a writ of mandamus to compel the city to provide the services contained in 
the plan; 
 Establish a timetable for providing those services; and 
 Enjoin the city from any further annexations until the services subject to the 
court’s order have been provided to the court’s satisfaction. T.C.A. § 6-51-109.  
 
Progress Report on Plan of Services6 
Six months after the plan is adopted and annually thereafter until it is fully implemented 
the city must publish a report on its progress toward fulfilling the plan and must 
schedule and hold a public hearing on the report. These reporting and hearing 
requirements apply to any plan of services not fully implemented, and any resident or 
property owner in the annexed area covered by the plan can file suit to force a city to 
prepare this report if it has not done so on schedule.  T.C.A. § 6-51-108. 
 
Amending a Plan of Services  
A plan of services may be amended under limited conditions: 
 
 An occurrence such as a natural disaster, an act of war, terrorism, or other 
unforeseen circumstances beyond the city’s control; or 
 The amendment does not substantially or materially decrease the type or level of 
services or delay the provisions of such services; or 
 The amendment has received approval in writing of a majority of the property 
owners by parcel in the annexed area. 
 
Before any amendment is adopted, the city must hold a public hearing preceded by at 
least 15 days notice.  T.C.A. § 6-51-108(c). 
 
An aggrieved property owner in the annexed territory can challenge the legality of an 
amendment to the plan of services within 30 days after the amendment is adopted. If 
the court finds that the city unlawfully amended the plan, it shall “decree the amendment 
null and void and shall reinstate the previous plan of services.”  T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d). 
 
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM 
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) [annexation by referendum] provides that “the plan of services 
shall address the same services and timing of services as required in § 6-51-102"  
                                
6 See Appendix F for sample progress report on plan of services. 
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[annexation by ordinance].  [See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum, Notice and 
Public Hearing on Annexation and Plan of Services Required.] 
 
That act does not indicate to what extent the above statutes apply to plans of services in 
annexations by referendum.  It is not clear whether that language embraces statutes 
governing annexation by ordinance that deal with a broad range of plan of services 
issues, including the effect of the failure of cities to fulfill prior plans of services, 
progress reports on plans of services, amending plans of services, and challenging and 
enforcing plans of services.  It should probably be assumed that they do. 
 
For this reason, a city contemplating annexation by referendum should consider drafting 
a plan of services that would survive a legal challenge as if it had been done in 
connection with an annexation by ordinance. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
“POPULATION BRACKETS” CONTAINED IN THE ANNEXATION LAW 
 
Generally 
Tennessee statutes are rife with various “population brackets” under which cities and 
counties in Tennessee are excepted from, or included under, a statute or statutes.  The 
same was true of numerous Tennessee annexation statutes.  Some of those population 
brackets were eliminated over time.  [See in particular, Frost v. City of Chattanooga, 
488 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. 1972), Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977), 
Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987), below.]  But Public Acts 
2014, Chapter 707, § 2, deleted T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a), (c) and (d), which had contained 
most of the remaining population brackets. 
 
Article XI, § 8, of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “The Legislature shall have 
no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of any particular individual....”  That 
provision has repeatedly been interpreted to prohibit the passage of laws containing 
population brackets and other classifications to benefit specific counties or cities as well 
as individuals, including private acts that suspend general laws, unless the classification 
rests upon a reasonable basis. [See, among the literally dozens of cases in this area, 
Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987); Mink v. City of Memphis, 
435 S.W.2d 114 (1968); Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1978); 
Knoxville’s Community Development Corp. v. Knox County, 665 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. 
1984); Brentwood Liquors Corp of Williamson County v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 
1973); Estrin v. Moss, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968); Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 
(1977); Clark v. Vaughn, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1941); Lineberger v. State ex rel. Beeler, 129 
S.W.2d 198 (1939); State ex rel Smith v. City of Chattanooga, 144 S.W.2d 1096 (1940); 
Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946); Prescott v. Duncan, 148 S.W. 
229 (1912); Board of Education v. Shelby County, 330 S.W.2d 569 (1960); Johnson City 
v. Allison, 362 S.W.2d 813 (1962); State ex rel. v. Mayor of Dyersburg, 235 S.W.2d 814 
(1954); Wiseman v. Smith, 95 S.W.2d 42 (1936); Blackwell v. Miller, 493 S.W.3d 88 
(Tenn. 1973); and numerous cases cited therein.] 
 
POPULATION AND OTHER BRACKETS IN ANNEXATION PRIORITIES STATUTE 
Population brackets are also found in T.C.A. §§ 6-51-109 and 110.  These population 
brackets may also violate Article XI, § 8, of the Tennessee Constitution. 
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-109 provides for the annexation by a larger municipality of all or part of 
the territory in a smaller municipality upon the petition of 20 percent of the voters of the 
smaller municipality if the larger municipality annexes by ordinance the territory 
proposed in the petition and the annexation is approved in a referendum by a majority of 
voters in the smaller municipality. T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) authorizes annexation by a 
smaller municipality of territory within the corporate limits of a larger municipality if the 
territory is fewer than 75 acres and meets other qualifications. T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a) 
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contains several questionable population and other brackets that are apparently aimed 
at T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g).  Moreover, T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and 
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) should probably be examined to determine whether they serve any 
useful purpose. 
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a) provides that nothing in this part [T.C.A.,Title 6, Chapter 51, part 1] 
nor in T.C.A. § 6-51-301 [mutual adjustments provision] shall be construed to authorize 
a smaller municipality to annex territory within the corporate limits of a larger 
municipality.  It also says the same thing with respect to the annexation by a larger 
municipality within the corporate limits of a smaller municipality in existence at the time 
of the proposed annexation except as to municipalities: 
  
 In counties with a population of not less than 65,000 nor more than 66,000 
according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census;  
 In counties with a population of 400,000 or more according to the 1970 or 
subsequent federal census; and 
 In counties having a metropolitan government, by a larger municipality with 
respect to territory within the corporate limits of a smaller municipality in 
existence for 10 or more years. 
 
In addition, the same statute provides that, notwithstanding any other provisions in this 
chapter [T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51] in counties having a population of not less than 
276,000 nor more than 277,000 according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census, 
nothing in this part [T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1] shall be construed to authorize 
annexation by a larger municipality of territory within the corporate limits of any smaller 
municipality in existence at the time of the proposed annexation. 
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(d) also contains population brackets and another bracket with 
respect to when an annexation ordinance is initiated as to annexation priorities. The 
brackets exempt from the application of the statute counties having a population of not 
less than 65,000 nor more than 66,000 and counties having a population of 400,000 or 
more according to the 1970 or subsequent federal census. It also exempts counties with 
a metropolitan government. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 ANNEXATION AND PLAN OF SERVICES 
 PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ISSUES7 
 
STATUTORY ANNEXATION ORDINANCE AND PLAN OF SERVICES HEARING 
REQUIREMENTS  
Generally 
The public notice and hearing requirements for annexation ordinances and plans of 
services were strengthened by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, and by subsequent 
statutes. However, some of the pre-Chapter 1101 cases interpreting and applying the 
annexation ordinance public hearing requirements (there are no such cases interpreting 
and applying the plan of services public hearing requirements) probably apply to the 
public notice and hearing requirements for annexations by referendum in Chapter 1101. 
But some of those cases reflect the failure of cities to strictly abide by the public hearing 
and notice requirements. Such a failure might not necessarily be fatal to an annexation 
or to a plan of services, but it invites that result and always gives the person challenging 
the annexation another issue to present to the court. Such failures are easy to avoid by 
knowing and strictly obeying public notice and hearing requirements contained in the 
annexation laws. 
 
Several recent statutes require cities to give the county mayor and emergency 
communications districts notice of both annexations and plans of services. This chapter 
deals only with statutes and cases dealing with public notice requirements. [See 
Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum; Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance; and 
Chapter 6, Plan of Services for the above notice requirements.] 
 
LEGAL STATUS OF DEFECTS IN ANNEXATION BY ORDINANCE AND 
ANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM 
Public notice and plan of services hearing issues were determined in annexation by 
ordinance cases to be procedural in nature.  It is said in Highwood Properties, Inc. v. 
City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009), that:  
 
[T]he courts have no power to vacate an annexation 
ordinance for purely procedural defects because no such 
authority has been granted by statute.  City of Watauga v. 
City of Johnson City, 589 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tenn. 1979).  
Rather, the general rule is that defects in an annexation 
ordinance must be presented in the context of a challenge to 
its reasonableness or necessity by way of a timely quo 
warranto challenge.  City of Oak Ridge, 583 S.W.2d at 898; 
                                
7For sample resolutions for a public hearing on annexation by referendum and by ordinance, see 
Appendices D and E. 
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see also City of Knoxville v. State ex rel. Graves, 207 Tenn. 
558, 341 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1960) holding that allegation was 
passed without a public hearing should be considered in 
connection with the question of the reasonableness of the 
ordinance.  (Internal quotation marks omitted by writer).  [At 
208.]   
 
A “timely” quo warranto challenge to an annexation ordinance must be brought within 
thirty days of the final passage of the annexation ordinance.   
 
Quo warranto challenges to annexations by referendum are not authorized by 
Tennessee annexation law.  But Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707 preserved Tennessee 
Code Annotated, § 6-51-102(b) which presently provides for a plan of services in both 
annexation by ordinance and annexation by referendum.  Tennessee Code Annotated, 
§ 6-51-102(b)(1) requires that “The plan of services shall be reasonable with respect to 
the scope of services to be provided and the timing of services.” 
 
But the notice requirements for annexation by referendum are particularly strict, 
directing that each property in the territory be given notice of the proposed annexation.  
[See Chapter 4, Annexation by Referendum.] 
 
Plan of Services 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4) provides that before the plan of services is adopted, the city 
must hold a public hearing. Notice of the time, place, and purpose of the public hearing 
“shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality not less 
than fifteen (15) days before the hearing.” The notice must also include the locations of 
a minimum of three copies of the plan of service, which the municipality must also make 
available for public inspection during all business hours from the date of notice of the 
public hearing.  
 
PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ISSUES 
City Charter Generally Governs Annexation Ordinance and Probably Annexation 
Resolution Procedures 
There are no formal annexation ordinance or resolution procedures prescribed by 
Tennessee’s annexation law.  That is also true of annexation by referendum. 
Annexation ordinances should be adopted following the ordinance procedures 
prescribed by the annexing city’s charter.  It was held in State ex rel. Balsinger v. Town 
of Madisonville, 435 S.W.2d 803 (1968), that an annexation ordinance was not required 
to be read at three separate meetings because neither the state’s annexation law nor 
the charter required such a procedure.  With respect to annexation by referendum, 
generally most municipal charters in Tennessee either do not provide for resolution 
procedures or require their passage on only one reading.  However, where a charter 
does prescribe resolution procedures, they should be followed. 
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T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) provided that a city “after notice and public hearing, by 
ordinance, could extend its corporate limits by annexation....”  In the unreported case of 
State ex rel. Gentry v. City of Bristol (Tenn. Ct. App., June 5, 1972), an annexation 
ordinance was attacked on the ground that the ordinance was passed on first reading 
prior to the public hearing. Under the city’s charter, it took two readings to pass the 
ordinance. The record showed that the ordinance was passed on first reading on 
December 1, 1970; that notice was thereafter published and a public hearing held on 
December 15, 1970; and that the ordinance was passed on second and final reading 
immediately after the public hearing. The court was of the opinion that there was 
substantial compliance with the statute. 
 
Where the charter of the city provided that no ordinance could be adopted at the same 
meeting at which introduced, the requirements of T.C.A. § 6-51-102 were met by having 
the public hearing four days after the introduction but before the ordinance was 
adopted. [Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 570 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977).] 
 
Even irregularities in city ordinance adoption procedures may be “forgiven” in some 
cases. An annexation ordinance in Saylors v. City of Jackson, 575 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. 
1978), was held valid even though it had not received a second as required by Robert’s 
Rules of Order (RRO), which the city had adopted to govern its meeting procedures, 
because the action on the ordinance was unanimous.  RRO declares that where such 
action is unanimous, a violation of the rules is without consequence.  
 
Changing the Area to Be Annexed  
The question of whether a city can describe an area being considered for annexation, 
for purposes of the public hearing, and subsequently annex parts of the area by several 
ordinances, perhaps in all less than the area on which the hearing was conducted, was 
raised in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961). The Tennessee Supreme Court 
appears to have approved such procedure: 
 
As a result of this notice and hearing an ordinance was not 
drawn immediately to take in the whole area pursuant to the 
notice but numerous and various ordinances were passed 
taking in smaller areas within the areas as prescribed in the 
notice, the very obvious reason being that in many of these 
other areas the people were asking for it and they knew 
there would be no contest about it.  [At 889.]  
 
In Maury County Farmers Co-op Corp. v. Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962), it was held 
that an annexation ordinance could annex two separate areas that were not contiguous 
to each other as long as each was contiguous to the city.  To the argument that the 
annexation of one area might be found to be reasonable and the annexation of the other 
unreasonable, the court responded that “the part of the ordinance describing that area 
might be eliminated under the familiar doctrine of elision.”  [At 221.] 
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ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING 
Generally 
There are no reported cases involving the adequacy of the public hearing on plans of 
services. Arguably, the cases involving the adequacy of the public hearing in annexation 
cases apply to the public hearings on the plan of services. However, Morton v. Johnson 
City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1979) speaks of the “political” component of the 
annexation hearing: 
 
…The words here in the Statute of a “public hearing” were 
not used with respect to a proceeding in which the 
constitutional rights of any person might be affected.  The 
subject before the Commission was the adoption of an 
ordinance annexing the territory in question.  Such a hearing 
as is required under the political or legislative issue of this 
kind is a kind of hearing that is to be accorded so that this 
body may make up its mind from a political standpoint 
[Emphasis is mine.] in their legislative action as to whether 
or not it is feasible and right to annex this territory. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass 247, 75 NE 619, 1 
LRS, NS, 752, 109 Am. St. Rep. 630, the Massachusetts 
court had before it the question of whether or not the Board 
of Health acting in a legislative capacity gave a proper kind 
of hearing under a similar act which required a public 
hearing.  The court held…a board…acting in a legislative 
capacity…is not required to act on sworn evidence…its 
action is final as is the action of the legislature in enacting 
the statute…[and] questions of fact passed on in adopting 
the provisions cannot be tried over in the courts.  In other 
words the only suggestions and the only requirement under 
this statute is that it be public; that the City Commission have 
an open public hearing so that they can hear those who are 
for or against the proposition and then make up their own 
minds from a legislative standpoint of whether or not such an 
ordinance would be feasible in view of their legislative duty to 
the City. 
 
This presents, under the facts in this case, a question of law 
for the Court to determine. There was no action being taken 
at this meeting by the Commission; there was no reason why 
the Commission should enter into an agreement pro or con 
with those appearing to speak their piece on behalf of this 
legislation.  The only question was to allow those that  
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wished to stay and say their piece to be allowed to do so and 
then the Commission could make up its own legislative mind. 
 [At 929.] 
 
Some of the same political considerations apply to hearings on plans of services, but 
given the Tennessee Open Records Law and the increasing statutory regulation of 
plans of services, the governing body of an annexing municipality should properly insure 
that the plan of services receives the weighty attention that it deserves. 
 
Inaccurate Descriptions of Territory to Be Annexed 
It has been held that an inaccurate description did not invalidate an annexation because 
an appended map correctly showed the territory to be annexed.  [Johnson City v. 
Maden, 304 S.W.2d 317 (1957).]  However, great care should be taken to ensure that 
the public hearings on annexations reflect maps and boundary descriptions of the 
territory proposed for annexation that are consistent and accurate. 
 
Inadequate Notice of Hearing  
In State ex rel. Robbins v. City of Jackson, 403 S.W.2d 304 (1966), an official notice 
published only five days in advance, taken together with a news article referring to the 
public hearing to be held and setting forth the area proposed for annexation, which 
appeared in the newspaper seven days prior to the public hearing, was held to be 
substantial compliance with the statute. But it is not clear how much tolerance the courts 
will exercise when there has been a failure of adequate notice in terms of time. In 
Surgoinsville v. Sandidge, 866 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), 11 days notice of a 
public hearing on an amendment to a zoning ordinance was held not to be substantial 
compliance when T.C.A. § 13-7-203 required “at least” 15 days notice. 
 
An annexation ordinance was attacked in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961), on 
the ground that the notice was insufficient because it had been given too long (nine 
months) before the ordinance was adopted.  Holding that the notice was adequate, the 
court reasoned that for approximately nine months after the notice was given the 
proposed annexation received constant publicity in the newspaper. 
 
Location and Environment of Public Meeting 
The location and environment of the meeting involving the passage of an annexation 
ordinance have also been issues.  As to the location of a public hearing, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Morton v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1979), said this: 
 
The call was for a meeting at the City Hall before the City 
Commission. This notice did not designate any particular 
room and of course the very obvious and only place that the 
meeting should and would be held, unless designated 
otherwise in the notice, is in the regular chambers of the City  
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Commission. Thus it is that the notice was sufficient to notify 
the inhabitants that the meeting would be in the Commission 
room....  [At 930.] 
 
In that case 300 people were gathered outside the meeting room, which could hold only 
40 people. The city commission refused to adjourn to another room but announced that 
it would hear everyone who wished to speak, “even if it took all night to do it.” Many of 
those who were present did not stay, but the commission heard anyone who wished to 
speak. The public hearing was adequate, declared the court, while it spoke of the 
purpose of the public hearing. 
 
The court also gave clear instructions regarding the time of holding a public hearing: 
 
The day that this public hearing was called for and held was 
on a Tuesday night while the regular meetings of the 
Commission were on Thursday night... The argument is that 
then this was not properly called because not held on a 
regular night. Of course this public hearing or hearing as was 
conducted by the Commission did not have to be on their 
meeting night....They could have this meeting anytime that 
they saw fit to have these public hearings.  [At 930.] 
 
Morton stands for the clear proposition that the purpose of the public hearing 
requirement is that the governing body “hear” any person who wishes to speak for or 
against the annexation proposal. It was cited in State v. City of Columbia, 360 S.W.2d 
39 (1962), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court also held the public hearing on an 
annexation ordinance adequate. There, 100 to 125 people were present for the hearing, 
and all who wished to do so were permitted to speak, “with the possible exception of 
one man, who jumped up so frequently he was asked to keep quiet.”  The meeting 
lasted about 90 minutes with a break of approximately 20 minutes.  [At 42.] 
 
In Stall v. Knoxville, 364 S.W.2d 898 (1962), the adequacy of the public hearing was 
also brought under attack. The court referred to the criteria set out in Morton v. Johnson 
City, above, and concluded: 
 
The Trial Judge found in the instant cases that these 
requirements were met, and the record clearly supports him 
in this regard. Proper notice of the hearing was given. It was 
held at the time and place designated in the notice. The 
council members were present with the mayor presiding, the 
doors were opened to the public. The record shows that 
opinions and discussions were invited and that many 
opinions were given and much discussion was had. The 
council chambers might not have seated all who wished to 
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come. However, the record shows that the meeting lasted for 
several hours and anyone who wished to be heard had the 
floor.  [At 901.] 
 
When an annexation ordinance reaches the stage of a public hearing a majority of the 
city’s governing body is probably a proponent of the annexation, but before and during 
the hearing the board should not take a hard position that indicates the matter is a 
“done deal.” The purpose of the public hearing is to provide an opportunity for objectors 
to bring to their attention any facts and relevant considerations that might have escaped 
their attention. In Maury County Farmers Co-op v. Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 (1962), 
the Tennessee Supreme Court considered an objection that “the city commissioners 
had already made up their legislative minds to annex,” based upon certain answers 
given by one of the commissioners on cross-examination but rejected it on the grounds: 
 
 ...that a reading of the whole of the testimony clearly shows 
that while the commissioners had proposed such 
annexation, as shown in the public notice, they had not 
foreclosed their minds, but afforded a fair and proper hearing 
and passed the ordinance only after careful consideration of 
the need and effect of the annexation.   
[At 221-22.] 
 
Generally, a governing body should simply “hear” persons who wish to speak during 
public hearings on annexation ordinances and resolutions and make no effort to justify 
the annexation proposal; to do so will usually lead to long and meaningless arguments. 
A good procedure is for the mayor or other presiding officer to recognize each person 
who wishes to speak and thank him courteously at the conclusion of his remarks. If the 
crowd is large, the governing body may wish to direct that slips of paper or cards to be 
signed by persons who desire to speak be circulated among the audience and direct the 
presiding officer to call on them in some order. It may also direct that a time limit be 
imposed on each speaker. 
 
Recent public attention to defects in public hearings for lack of the ability of the 
audience to hear the proceedings should probably be taken into account when 
annexation and plan of services hearings are scheduled.  Such public meetings 
frequently cause controversy and unusually large public attendance.  For that reason, 
the environment of the meeting and its ability to accommodate crowds and sometimes 
noise should be considered. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
“PROBLEM” ANNEXATIONS 
 
GENERALLY - PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS 
Following Bristol v. Earhart, 970 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. 1970), there was debate over 
whether that case applied only to annexations that did not contain any people, private 
property or commercial property.  Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 
S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009) addressed that question: 
 
In State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, however, we 
recognized an exception (other than a constitutional 
challenge) to the rule and held that, in certain situations 
where no quo warranto action is statutorily available, it is 
permissible to challenge an ordinance’s validity with a 
declaratory judgment action.  970 S.W.2d at 953.  In Earhart 
the validity of an ordinance enacted several years earlier 
was challenged because the annexed area contained no 
“people, private property, or commercial activity.”  Id at 954. 
See State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d 
545, 547 (Tenn. 1980) Long and lean…annexations, so long 
as they take in people, private property, or commercial 
activity, by necessity cannot be challenged in a quo warranto 
action because only an ‘aggrieved owner of property that 
borders or lies within territory that is the subject of an 
annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof may 
file such a challenge.’  Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A). 
(Emphasis is the court’s).  We held, therefore, that the action 
for a declaratory judgment was permissible, but limited our 
holding in two key ways.  First, we permitted only challenges 
to ultra vires acts, that is, test of the validity of an annexation 
ordinance alleged to exceed the authority delegated by the 
legislature.  Earhart 97 S.W.2d 954.  Second, we stated that 
it is only where the quo warranto proceeding is not available, 
[that] alternative equitable remedies are not barred.  Id at 
952.  [citing 65 Am. Jur.2d Quo Warranto, § 7 (1972)]  
(Where the remedy by quo warranto is available, it is usually 
held that there is no concurrent remedy in equity unless by 
virtue of statutory provision).  [At 708.]  [Internal quotation 
marks, etc. omitted by writer].  [Emphasis is mine.] 
 
Plaintiffs in Highwoods, said the court, failed in their claim for a declaratory judgment 
voiding the annexation at issue, because: 
Reduced to its essence, the challenge by Plaintiffs is to a 
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single aspect of the court’s approved settlement of the 
earlier lawsuit attacking the reasonableness of the 
Ordinance.  That is, the City’s consent to delay the planned 
annexation of Area B until 2013.  A delay in the effective 
date of the annexation fits more neatly within the 
classification of procedural defects, as defined in City of Oak 
Ridge and City of Watauga-issues that we held must be 
presented in a quo warranto proceedings and considered in 
the context of the reasonableness of the annexation.  [At 
708-09.] 
 
While Bristol v. Earhart may have been limited to annexation ordinances that took in no 
person, private property, or commercial property, both Earhart and Highwoods appear 
to open the door to annexation suits based on ultra vires annexations that are not 
authorized by the General Assembly.  If that is so, it is probably a very narrow opening.  
With particular respect to annexations by referendum, it is difficult to say here what 
kinds of annexations that category might encompass.  One category comes immediately 
to mind:  annexations that are not contiguous. 
 
GENERALLY – CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009), declares 
that: 
 
The importance of correctly resolving constitutional issues 
suggests that constitutional issues should rarely be 
foreclosed by procedural technicalities.  Colonial Pipeline, 
263 S.W.3d at 844-45…The stringent restrictions on any 
challenge to an annexation apply only when constitutional 
issues are not at stake.  [At 709.] 
 
In that case, the city annexed Area A and Area B, the latter of which became effective 
later than the annexation of the former.  One of the questions was whether the fact that 
the population in Area A would pay taxes longer than the population in Area B violated 
the tax equality and uniformity requirement of Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee 
Constitution.  That issue qualified as a constitutional question, said the Court, but held 
that Article II, Section 28 was not violated because: 
 
“There is nothing in the record to suggest that the City of 
Memphis or any other taxing authority is implementing 
different tax rates within its own borders.  Area B will not be 
annexed into the city limits of Memphis until 2013, so it is not  
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necessary that Area A and Area B property be taxed at the 
same rate at this time.  They are currently in different 
jurisdictions for purposes of this analysis.”  [At 710.] 
 
But it is difficult to determine what other constitutional issues may arise in annexations. 
Presumably, such issues could arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution as well as provisions of the Tennessee Constitution.  But there is no record 
of Tennessee annexations, by ordinance or by referendum, being overturned on 
constitutional grounds.  However, several annexation cases have put constitutional 
issues in a special category, presumably in the event they should arise.  See 
Highwoods, immediately above [at 709], and Vicars v. Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) [At 369-370].  Even hearing and notice procedural defects in 
annexations have been resolved under state annexation laws.  It was held in City of 
Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1978) that, “…the courts are not 
expressly or impliedly authorized to void a municipal [annexation] ordinance for failure of 
the municipality to give notice or hold a public hearing.”  [At 896], and in City of 
Wautaga v. City of Johnson City, 589 S.W.2d 901 (Tenn. 1979), that “…courts were 
without statutory or common law authority to vacate an annexation ordinance for failure 
to follow the procedures outlined in [what is now Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-102], such as 
procedural defects in notices and public hearings.”  [At 905.] 
 
Substantive constitutional challenges to Tennessee’s annexation law have also been 
turned aside.  Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, amended in 1953, 
provides that, “The General Assembly shall by general law provide the exclusive 
methods by which municipalities may be created, merged, consolidated and dissolved 
and by which municipal boundaries may be altered,” which in 1955 resulted in the 
adoption of Public Acts 1955, Chapter 113, Tennessee’s first comprehensive 
annexation law.  It was said of that annexation law in State ex rel. Balsinger v. Town of 
Madisonville, 435 S.W.2d 803 (1968), that: 
 
It is contended that this act is void because it is in conflict 
with the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States, which provides that  ‘no person shall be *** deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation’; and also because in conflict with similar 
provisions of the constitution of the state of Tennessee, ‘that 
no man shall be *** deprived of his life, liberty or property but 
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land (article I, 
§ 8); and ‘that no man’s particular services shall be 
demanded, or property taken or applied to public use without 
the consent of his representatives, or without just 
compensation being made therefore.’  Article 1, § 21….  As 
a matter of course, the act would be inoperative, null or void, 
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if, in fact, it violated any of those provisions.  But it cannot be 
that it does so.  The extension of corporate limits so as to 
include additional territory is in no sense an impairment of 
the owner’s liberty.  Nor is it a taking of private property for 
public use.  If it were held to be so, then no municipal 
corporation could be established or enlarged, and none of 
these valuable instrumentalities of the State would have a 
lawful existence….  Even the statutes of annexation to which 
complainants ascribe the sanctity of general laws would be 
utterly unavailing for the same reason.  [At 281-82.] 
 
CORRIDOR ANNEXATIONS 
Generally  
Chapter 1101 set restrictions on how and when corridor annexations could occur during 
the period before the countywide growth plan was adopted. Those restrictions expired 
after the adoption of the countywide growth plans. T.C.A. § 6-58-108(c). But, corridor 
annexations, whether done by ordinance or by referendum, must still be approached 
with caution. 
 
In State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court distinguished between “corridor,” “strip,” and “shoestring” 
annexations on one hand, and “long and lean” annexations on the other. In that case, 
the city annexed an area contiguous to the city about one mile long, the width of the 
main highway through the city. The territory had a population of 47 people. In upholding 
the annexation as reasonable, the court said: 
 
We should emphasize that this is not, as appellants insist, 
merely a “strip” or “shoestring” or “corridor” annexation, 
although it is long and lean. Such annexations, so long as 
they take in people, private property, or commercial activity, 
and rest on some reasonable and rational basis, is not per 
se to be condemned. We do not deal with an annexation 
wherein a city attempts to run its corporate limits down the 
right-of-way of an established road without taking in a single 
citizen or a single piece of private property. Such an 
annexation is perhaps questionable and is not here involved. 
As in any annexation, and more particularly one where a 
geometrically irregular parcel of land is annexed, the Court 
must scrutinize the stated and ostensible purpose of the 
annexation.  [At 547.]  [Emphasis is mine.] 
 
There are two substantive points in Collier: 
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 First, by whatever name they are called, annexations that run down rights 
of way or other artificial or natural features of land and that take in no 
other territory or people are “perhaps questionable”; and 
 
 Second, in any annexation, particularly those involving geometrically 
irregular parcels of land, the court must scrutinize the stated and 
ostensible purpose of the annexation. 
 
In a broad sense, most annexations are geometrically irregular, but Collier applied that 
description to annexations that are not reasonably consistent with the planned and 
orderly growth of the city.  [Also see Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512 
(Tenn. 1990).] 
 
Challenges to Strip, Shoestring, and Corridor Annexations 
Generally, T.C.A. § 6-51-103 authorizes challenges to annexation ordinances by quo 
warranto suits by property owners inside the annexed territory within 30 days following 
the annexation. But in State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 
1998), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that T.C.A. § 6-51-103 applies only to 
challenges based on the reasonableness of the annexation. It permitted property 
owners annexed in 1995 by the City of Bristol to challenge by a declaratory judgment 
suit a corridor annexation adopted in 1989; the territory annexed in 1995 was attached 
to the corridor annexed in 1989. Citing State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 599 
S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the court frowned upon some corridor annexations, declaring 
that “the 30 day limitation does not apply to declaratory judgment suits contesting the 
validity of an ordinance which purports to annex an area that does not include people, 
private property, or commercial activity and is, therefore, void.” [At 954.]  [Citing Collier.] 
 
In that connection it also declared that: 
 
The majority of courts have interpreted the requirement that 
annexed land be “contiguous” to not allow the annexation of 
thin strips of land to connect a larger parcel of land to a 
municipality. [Citation omitted.] .... These decisions articulate 
the principle implicit in the Tennessee statute.  [At 953-54.] 
 
The challenge to the annexation in Earhart was based on the proposition that the 
annexation was an ultra vires act. 
   
“DONUT HOLE” ANNEXATIONS 
Generally  
Donut hole annexations rest on legally shaky ground in Tennessee. In City of Kingsport 
v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978), Crown 
Enterprises challenged Kingsport’s annexation of 806 acres, which included an 85-acre 
industrial park owned by Crown Enterprises and used by its subsidiary, Mason and 
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Dixon Lines (M&D). The trial court found the annexation unreasonable for several 
reasons:  The 85-acre site used by M&D was industrial, M&D provided virtually all its 
own services, and annexation of the M&D property was solely for the purpose of 
obtaining tax revenue in violation of T.C.A. § 6-51-103. 
 
In overturning the trial court, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that, “The basic 
fallacy in the trial judge’s conclusion is that he treated the controversy as if the Crown-
M&D Property were the only territory being annexed as opposed to being but a small 
portion of a substantially larger territory being annexed in good faith.” The court was not 
impressed with Crown Enterprise’s argument that M&D didn’t need city services 
because: 
 
The whole process of annexation would be frustrated if the 
city could only annex those properties then in need of city 
services. The result of this would tend to create islands of 
unincorporated areas within a city and the archipelagic 
monstrosity thus created would thwart the rendition of 
essential city services and would not be in the public 
interest. 
 
Appellees do not contest the annexation of the remaining 
property. Should we uphold their contention the result would 
be the creation of an 85 acre island or enclave, completely 
surrounded by the City of Kingsport. This area thus omitted 
would be within, but not a part of a city. Absent the most 
compelling considerations, such a situation would be 
intolerable and an annexation that produced such a result 
would not meet the test of reasonableness. [At 814.] 
[Emphasis is mine.] 
 
Kinds of Donut Hole Annexations 
The courts in other states have gone both ways on the question of whether donut hole 
annexations meet the test of contiguity where, as in the case of Tennessee, the 
annexation statute does not define the term “contiguity.” Two kinds of donuts have been 
issues in those cases: one where one or more parts of the donut hole actually touches 
the city (technically, the donut is broken at one or more points) and one where the donut 
hole is completely surrounded by the city. The weight of authority is that donut hole 
annexations of the latter kind do not meet the test of contiguity. [See 49 ALR3d 589.] 
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc. 582 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978), 
points to the prospect that the Tennessee courts could also follow the majority rule and 
hold that such annexations are not contiguous, and for that reason violate state law 
requiring annexations to adjoin the existing city.  [See Chapters 4 and 5, Annexation by 
Referendum, and Annexation by Ordinance.]  Annexations by referendum or by 
ordinance must be contiguous. 
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Indeed, it would take only a short step for the Tennessee courts to connect Crown 
Enterprise and Earhart on that point. 
 
ANNEXATION BY ACQUIESCENCE 
Two unreported Tennessee cases deal with the question of how the courts might treat 
an annexation that is procedurally defective in some way but that has been treated by  
both the municipality and the population in the annexed territory as part of the 
municipality for a long period. 
 
In King v. City of Watertown, 1986 WL 10696 (Tenn. Ct. App.), the city’s charter 
required ordinances to be passed on two readings and to be signed by the mayor. The 
annexation ordinance at issue in this case was passed only once on January 26, 1976, 
and never signed by the mayor. The court held that the 30-day limit on the filing of quo 
warranto annexation suits contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-103 did not apply because the 
annexation ordinance had never been passed, but it also held that the “annexed” 
territory was part of the city by acquiescence. 
 
The court reasoned that: 
 
1. The property appeared on the tax rolls of the city in 1978, and the plaintiff’s 
predecessors in title paid city property taxes for the years 1978 through 1982. 
The plaintiffs purchased the property on November 5, 1982, and paid city 
property taxes for the year 1983 and business taxes in 1982 and 1983 for the 
grocery and fruit market they operated there. 
2. The city charges outside residents for water at the rate of one-and-one-half 
times the rate it charges inside residents. The plaintiffs have at all times paid 
the inside water rate. 
3. The city provides free garbage pickup to city residents and to businesses for 
$6 per month. The plaintiffs turned down city garbage service for their store. 
4. The plaintiffs were provided city police protection. 
5. All the county and city maps since 1978 showed the property as being located 
within the city limits of Watertown. 
6. The plaintiffs raised no question regarding being a part of the city until 1983 
when they applied to the Wilson County Beer Board for a license to sell beer 
at their grocery store. The sale of beer was prohibited inside the city of 
Watertown. They were refused a license because the city of Watertown 
contended the property was within the corporate limits of the city. 
 
Citing Roane County v. Anderson County, 14 S.W. 1079 (1890), Putnam County v. 
White County, 203 S.W. 334 (1918), and Putnam County v. Smith County, 164 S.W. 
1147 (1914), for the proposition that a county could lose property to another county by 
laches and long acquiescence, the court also pointed to several cases in other 
jurisdictions in which it had been held that a local government can lose property to 
another local government by acquiescence: City of Whiting v. City of East Chicago, 359 
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N.E.2d 536 (1977); Sarry v. Lake, 28 P.2d . 80 (1933) (Calif.); LaPorta v. Village of 
Philmont, 346 N.E.2d 503 (1976) (New York). It also pointed to Township of Scotch 
Plains v. Town of Westfield for the proposition that “It has also been held that maps 
published by authority of law may be referred to as evidence.”  [At 4.] 
 
In this case, concluded the court: 
 
We are of the opinion that acquiescence over the long period 
of time in the location of the municipal boundary by both the 
municipality and the inhabitants of the municipality where 
municipal action and improvements have been done under 
the assumption that the property is located within the 
boundary will support the conclusion that the boundaries 
acquiesced in are the true boundaries...Here, plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in title have acquiesced in the property 
being considered inside the city limits of Watertown, 
Tennessee. The property was originally zoned and 
subdivided to the plaintiffs’ and their predecessors’ benefit 
by and according to the zoning codes of the City of 
Watertown. City services have been provided to and enjoyed 
by the plaintiffs. City and county maps show the property to 
be inside the corporate limits of the City of Watertown.... 
Plaintiffs acquiesced in their property being a part of the City 
of Watertown until such time as it no longer suited their 
purposes. Then, and only then, did they raise any objection. 
[At 4.] 
 
It is clear that a similar result would have been reached in White v. City of Townsend, 
1995 WL 306877 (Tenn. Ct. App.), had not the city held two annexation referenda [the 
first ended in a tie, the second in a defeat for the annexation] pending the appeal of the 
trial court’s decision in 1994 that the annexation ordinance passed in November 1959, 
was procedurally defective. The court at length discussed King v. City of Watertown and 
declared that: 
 
We are of the opinion that under the authority of King and 
under the circumstances here the plaintiffs’ property was, 
prior to this action, located within the corporate limits of the  
City of Townsend. We are compelled to point out, however 
that a Rule 11, T.R.A.P., application was made to the 
Supreme Court for review of King v. City of Watertown.  
 
Permission to appeal was denied, with the Supreme Court 
concurring in results only, January 5, 1987. Since we are not 
privy to the reasons of the Supreme Court for their action, 
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we nevertheless accept King as an implicit approval of the 
principle of “annexation by acquiescence,” since in our view, 
the result reached in King could have been reached in no 
other way except through annexation by acquiescence or 
some form of estoppel brought about the acquiescence and 
acceptance of city services.  [At 7.] 
 
But the court reasoned that “the action of the city in calling two referenda while 
asserting the property in question is within the municipal boundaries of the city is 
contradictory and an effective disclaimer of ‘annexation by acquiescence.’”  [At 10.] 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
EFFECT OF ANNEXATION ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS 
 
ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY’S RIGHT TO PROVIDE MUNICIPAL SERVICES 
Two statutes generally address the right of an annexing municipality to provide 
municipal services inside the annexed territory, including utility services: T.C.A.  
§ 6-51-111 with respect to all municipal services except service provided by electrical 
cooperatives, and T.C.A. § 6-51-112 with respect to services provided by electrical 
cooperatives.  
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-111 provides that following an annexation accomplished by either 
ordinance or referendum: 
 
… an annexing municipality and any affected instrumentality 
of the State of Tennessee, such as, but not limited to, a 
utility district, sanitary district, school district, or other public 
service district, shall attempt to reach agreement in writing 
for allocation and conveyance to the annexing municipality of 
any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets, 
and liabilities of such state instrumentality that justice and 
reason may require in the circumstances. Any and all 
agreements entered into before March 8, 1955, relating to 
annexation shall be preserved. The annexing municipality, if 
and to the extent it may choose, shall have the exclusive 
right to perform or provide municipal and utility functions and 
services in any territory which it annexes, subject, 
notwithstanding § 7-82-301 or any other statute, subject, 
however, to the provisions of this section with respect to 
electric cooperatives. [Subsection (a).] 
 
The same statute provides that:  
 
 Subject to the annexing city’s exclusive rights under the statute, any 
matters upon which the parties have not come to a written agreement in 
60 days after the operative date of the annexation shall be settled by 
arbitration and review under the rules set out in the statute. [Subsection 
(b).] 
 
 Where the annexed territory is being provided with utility service by a state 
instrumentality, the agreement or arbitration award must protect the 
bondholders and contract rights under the conditions of the statute. 
[Subsection (c).] 
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 If a private individual or business entity provides utility services within the 
boundaries of a municipality pursuant to a privilege, franchise, etc., from 
the municipality, and the municipality annexes territory which includes the 
service area of a utility district, the private individual or business and the 
utility district shall attempt to reach an agreement for the latter to convey 
to the former any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets 
and liabilities of such utility district that reason and justice may require. If 
an agreement is not reached, then notwithstanding the change of 
municipal boundaries, the service area of the utility district shall remain 
unchanged and the private individual or business entity shall not provide 
utility service in the utility district’s service area. [Subsection (d).] 
 
 If at the time of the annexation the annexed territory is being provided with 
utility service by a municipal utility service or other state instrumentality, 
including a utility district, the annexing municipality can purchase all or part 
of the utility system by delivering to the utility system written notice of its 
election to exercise its right under the statute to be the exclusive service 
provider. The purchase price and terms of payment shall be those agreed 
upon by the parties. If the parties cannot agree on a purchase price, a final 
determination of the fair market value of the properties being acquired and 
all other outstanding issues related to the provision of utility services in the 
annexed area shall be made using the arbitration procedures contained in 
Subsection (b), above. Additional provisions governing arbitration are 
contained in the statute. [Subsection (e).] 
 
STATUTORY CONFLICT INVOLVING WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT 
AUTHORITIES 
T.C.A. § 6-51-111 prescribes an absolute right by an annexing municipality to provide 
utility services inside the annexed territory, but T.C.A. § 5-6-120 provides that 
notwithstanding any other statute, “From and after the creation of a water and 
wastewater treatment authority and the establishment of its service area, the authority 
shall be the sole and exclusive provider of its authorized service in its service area,” 
except that it can “cede all or any portion of its service area to another governmental 
entity upon the [authority’s] board determining in its sole discretion that the public 
convenience and necessity requires the same.” 
 
In unreported City of Collegedale v. Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment 
Authority, 2002 WL 1765776 (Tenn. Ct. App.) Collegedale annexed certain territory in 
Hamilton County, and both the city and the water and wastewater treatment authority 
claimed ownership and control of sewer facilities in the annexed territory.  The former 
argued that under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-111(b) “subject to such the 
exclusive right [of the city] to provide services in the annexed area under subsection (a) 
of that statute” the parties were to arbitrate other matter upon which they did not agree, 
the latter argued that under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 5-6-120 it had the exclusive 
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right to provide sewer service in the annexed territory.  However, the court did not 
resolve the conflict between the two statutes; rather, it held that, “the language 
contained in T.C.A. § 5-6-120(a)(1), above referenced is only applicable to areas which 
have been ‘designated,’” and “it is undisputed that no specific designation of a service 
area had been made as of the effective date of the City’s annexation.”  [At 3.]  
Presumably, the city’s right to provide utility service in the annexed area was ultimately 
upheld. 
 
Tennessee Attorney General’s Opinion 14-19 (February 14, 2014) opined that 
Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-111 took precedence over Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 5-6-120.  It reasoned that an amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated, 
§ 6-51-111(e) by Public Acts 2003, Chapter 93, (subsequent to the City of Collegedale 
case, above) broadened that statute’s application from “electric service” and “electric 
distribution system” to “utility service” and “utility system.”  It concluded that: 
 
Because there is an irreconcilable conflict between those two 
statutes, the later-enacted provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 
6-51-111(e) impliedly repeal the provisions of Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 5-6-120 to the extent of the inconsistency between 
the two.  As a result, when an annexing municipality wants to 
provide water and/or wastewater services in annexed 
territory that is claimed to be within a WWTA’s existing 
“service area” the applicable statutory provisions are those in 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-111(e).  
 
ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY’S PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION 
Subsection (e), above, was added to T.C.A. § 6-51-111 by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 
922, undoubtedly in response to the case of Knoxville Utilities Board v. Lenoir City 
Utilities Board, 943 S.W.2d 979 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The question in that case was 
whether T.C.A. § 6-51-111 or T.C.A. § 6-51-112 controlled the taking by the City of 
Knoxville of utility property owned by the Lenoir City Utilities Board in territory annexed 
by the City of Knoxville. At the time of the annexation T.C.A. § 6-51-111 contained no 
provisions for compensation to be paid by an annexing municipality for such property to 
governmental entities covered by that statute, while T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provided for 
compensation to be paid by an annexing municipality to electrical cooperatives for the 
taking of such property. The Lenoir City Utilities Board did not qualify as an electrical 
cooperative under T.C.A. § 6-51-112; rather, it fell under T.C.A. § 6-51-111 and was not 
entitled to compensation for the taking of its property by the City of Knoxville. But  
subsection (e) is limited to municipal electrical services and state instrumentalities, 
including utility districts; it does not apply to utilities providing other kinds of utility 
services or to electrical cooperatives. 
 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Hamilton County v. City of Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d 
153 (1958) held that a county is an affected instrumentality within the statute, and in 
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City of Lenoir City v. State ex rel. City of Loudon, 571 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. 1978), held 
that a municipality is an affected instrumentality within the statute. 
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provides that if the annexing municipality owns and operates its own 
electric system, it shall either offer to purchase any electric distribution properties and 
service rights within the annexed area that are owned by an electric cooperative, or 
grant such cooperative a franchise to serve the annexed area. Procedural details are 
spelled out in that section. 
 
UTILITY DISTRICTS8 
Protection of Utility Districts Under State Law 
In Hendersonville v. Hendersonville Utility District, 506 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1973), it was held that although a city by its offer would acquire all of a utility district’s 
assets and would assume all of its liabilities, arbitration was a necessary prerequisite to 
filing of suit by the city to be allowed immediately to assume control and operation of the 
system. 
 
The court outlined some of the items that should be considered as subject to arbitration: 
  
It is the argument of the City that since the City by its offer 
will acquire all of the Utility District’s assets and will assume 
all of the liabilities of the Utility District there is simply nothing 
to arbitrate as the Utility District is a public agency holding 
property by virtue of a trust in favor of the public and the City 
occupies the same status. Therefore, it is only the matter of 
a successor trustee assuming all the assets, whatever they 
might be, and liabilities, whatever they might be, of the first 
trustee. This being true, there can be no disputed issues 
which would be the subject of a proper arbitration. It is 
readily admitted, that if only a small portion of the Utility 
District was taken over by the City and the Utility District 
were to continue its operation in the non-annexed area, such 
things as the value of the facilities received, the division of 
liability for bonded indebtedness, etc., would be the proper 
subject of arbitration. 
 
                                
8 Appendix G contains a resolution of the City of Jackson setting forth the terms and conditions for taking 
over a utility district and a subsequent ordinance fixing water rates in the acquired area, a contract 
whereby the City of Memphis took over the utility district in the Frayser area, resolutions adopted by a 
utility district and Johnson City for this purpose, and a contract for the City of Clinton to take over the First 
Utility District of Anderson County.  
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We cannot agree with this argument. The statute does not 
limit its application to cases of a partial take-over. It should 
be noted that it is required by the statute that the parties 
“shall attempt to reach agreement in writing for allocation 
and conveyance to the annexing municipality of any or all 
public functions, rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities 
of such state instrumentality that justice and reason may 
require in the circumstances.” The statute also contemplates 
possible disagreements between the parties on the matters 
to be attempted to be agreed upon for it further provides 
“any such matters upon which the respective parties are not 
in agreement in writing within sixty (60) days after the 
operative date of such annexation shall be settled by 
arbitration with the laws of arbitration of the state of 
Tennessee effective at the time of submission to the 
arbitrators, and subsection (2) of § 23-501 shall not apply to 
any arbitration arising under §§ 6-309–6-320.” 
 
We do not here attempt to list or limit in any way items which 
could be in dispute and the subject of arbitration for such 
attempt would be beyond the scope of this appeal, but even 
when the annexing authority is to take over an entire utility 
district, the date of takeover might very well be the subject of 
disagreement and arbitration. In the instant case, that 
problem is present as well as others. For instance, the 
second paragraph of the statute provides for protection of 
the bond holders to be an item of the agreement of 
arbitration.  Also, it must be born in mind in this case that the 
City is going to, or so they say they will provide services for 
members of the Utility District outside the annexed area. It 
would seem to us that “justice and reason may require” 
some sort of written agreement on this subject by the City 
and release of the Utility District trustees. 
 
We hold the arbitration as set out in the statute is a 
necessary prerequisite to the filing of such a suit as this. We 
think it would be somewhat difficult for the Chancellor below 
to order a take-over of assets when a list of those assets is 
not before the Court and the Chancellor has no knowledge 
of what they actually are. This case involves more than 
underground pipes and fireplugs, it involved service 
equipment, bonded indebtedness, etc. As we view it, to hold 
any other way would defeat the purpose of the statute, which 
no doubt was to relieve the Court of having to supervise the 
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dispute between the parties until some sort of agreement or 
award had been made through arbitration which the Court 
could either at that time approve or disapprove.  [At 151-52.] 
 
After the City of Memphis annexed an area that included a part of the area served by a 
utility district, the city entered into an agreement to take over and to assume all 
obligations of the district. Before the annexation the district had contracted with a 
subdivision developer, agreeing to build water supplying facilities and to supply water to 
the subdivision. The developer had deposited $88,456.90 with the district as the 
estimated cost of construction, and the district agreed to refund the deposit by annual 
payments equal to 50 percent of water revenues from its customers in the subdivision 
for a period of 10 years or until the total amount of the deposit was repaid. The contract 
contained a provision that in the event the ownership or contract of the district was sold 
or transferred the balance of refunds would be paid in full at that time. The developer 
sued to enforce the terms of the contract, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals, held 
that the city was bound by the acceleration of refund provision of the contract. Pitts & 
Company, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 558 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). 
 
The City of Knoxville persistently declined to resort to arbitration in a wrangle with the 
Fountain City Utility District that lasted for more than four years.  Practically all of the 
district had been annexed, and it was conceded by all that acquisition by the city was 
the only reasonable solution. The utility district refused to go out of business, however, 
unless the city would agree to use its surplus funds to reimburse its customers for their 
“equity” in the system. As the successor public agency, the City of Knoxville was, of 
course, entitled to assets in the form of surplus funds as well as pipes in the ground and 
other properties. For that reason, its agreement to this disposition of such funds was the 
equivalent of it making payment. Finally, to end the long dispute without recourse to the 
courts, the city in 1966 agreed to a distribution of $387,500 in surplus funds, which the 
district paid to the customers it was serving on December 31, 1965.  
 
PROTECTION OF UTILITY DISTRICTS UNDER FEDERAL LAW  
It is provided by 7 United States Code, § 1926(b) that: 
 
The service provided or made available through any such 
association shall not be curtailed or limited by inclusion of 
the areas to be served by such association within the 
boundaries of any municipal corporation or other public 
body, or by the granting of any private franchise for similar 
service within such area during the term of such loan; nor 
shall the happening of such event be the basis of requiring 
such association to secure any franchise, license, or permit  
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as a condition to continuing to serve the area served by the 
association at the time of the occurrence of such event. 
[Emphasis is mine.] 
 
This law applies even where the municipality has annexed the area in which it wishes to 
provide utility service. The reason is that many, if not most, utility districts have 
outstanding FmHA or RECD loans. 
 
However, some recent cases have held or implied that where a utility district does not 
meet the “service provided or made available” requirement of § 1926(b), it is not 
accorded the protection of that statute. 
 
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (in which Tennessee is located) denied a water 
district’s claim to the exclusive right to provide service in territory annexed by a city and 
in territory that lay outside its boundaries. In Lexington-South Elkhorn Water District v. 
City of Wilmore, Ky., 93 F.3d 230 (1996), the court observed that the water district 
provided no water service in, and had received no requests for service from, any of the 
disputed areas.  In the annexed area, the water district had no facilities in or adjacent to 
the disputed properties; in the 10 areas outside the limits of the annexed territory, only 
one contained the water district’s main, and that main had been constructed after the 
city had begun providing water service in the area; and in the other nine areas outside 
the annexed territory that contained no mains, one of the areas had a main within 50 
yards; the others ranged in distance from 0.1 to 0.4 miles. 
 
Reviewing earlier cases on the application of § 1926(b), the court said that: 
 
These cases teach that whether an association had made 
service available is determined based on the existence of 
facilities on, or in the proximity of, the location to be served. 
If an association does not already have service in existence, 
water lines must either be within or adjacent to the property 
claimed to be protected by § 1926( b) prior to the time an 
allegedly encroaching association begins providing service in 
order to be eligible for § 1926(b). Based on the location of 
Lexington-South Elkhorn’s distribution lines, it had not made  
service available prior to the time that Wilmore began 
providing service to the disputed properties.... [At 237.] 
[Emphasis is mine.] 
 
But language in that case suggests that had the district obtained the certificate of 
necessity that water districts were required under Kentucky law to obtain with respect to 
territory in which they claimed the right of service, the question of whether service was 
“available” may have been closer. The court pointed out that Kentucky law required a 
water district that had obtained such a certificate to make reasonable extensions of 
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water service to all customers at least the first 50 feet, and a longer one where the 50-
foot extension was unreasonable under the circumstances. But immediately after 
making that observation, the court declared, “Thus, a key factor in determining whether 
a water district has made water service available is the proximity of the water district’s 
distribution lines to areas in dispute.”  [At 235.]  
 
Sequoyah County Rural Water District No. 7 v. Muldrow, 191 F.3d 1192 (10 Cir. 1999), 
declares that, “Courts are in disagreements about what is required to satisfy the ‘made 
services available’ requirement of § 1926(b).” [At 1201.]  It divides the cases into three 
categories based on the kind of test the particular court applied to determine if the 
service was made available: (1) legal obligation (under state law) to provide utility 
service test, (2) “pipes in the ground test,” and (3) a combination of both tests. 
 
The court in that case decided there was no state (Oklahoma) law duty to provide 
service but declared that even if there were: 
 
...we do not think that such a duty, standing alone, is 
sufficient to meet the “made service available” requirement. 
For one thing, to hold that a legal duty is sufficient to meet 
the requirement would be contrary to the language of the 
statute, which provides protection only against curtailments 
of “service provided or made available.” 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). 
In addition, allowing a water district to meet the requirement 
simply by showing a legal duty to serve may undermine the 
principle goals of the statute, which is to “encourage water 
development by expanding the number of potential users of 
such systems.” [Citations omitted.] “Inherent in the concept 
of providing service or making service available is the 
capability of providing service, or, at a minimum, of providing 
service within a reasonable time.”  [Citing Bell Arthur, below.] 
If a water association has a legal duty to provide service but 
has no proximate or adequate facilities or cannot provide 
them within a reasonable time, it is the customer who 
suffers. For these reasons, we think that the second prong of 
§ 1926(b) should focus primarily on whether the association 
has in fact [emphasis is the court’s] “made service available,” 
i.e., on whether the association has proximate and adequate 
“pipes in the ground” with which it has served or can serve 
the disputed customers within a reasonable time.  [At 1203.] 
 
The court sent this case back to the district court to make a finding of fact on the 
question of whether the water association had “made service available” under the “pipes 
in the ground” test. 
Whatever confusion the cases create with respect to the question of whether the state 
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law that requires a utility district to provide service to customers in its service area 
should be weighed in determining whether service is “available” under § 1926(b), 
Tennessee is among those states whose laws regulating utility districts do not require 
such districts to provide service as a matter of right. For that reason, the “pipes in the 
ground” test probably applies to Tennessee under Lexington-South Elkhorn Water 
District and subsequent cases in other federal judicial jurisdictions. 
   
The question of what is “available” utility service was hit almost head on in Bell Arthur 
Water Corporation v. Greenville Utilities Commission, 173 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1999). 
There, in 1994, the Greenville, North Carolina, Utilities Commission agreed to provide 
sewer service to the Ironwood development. In 1995, the City of Greenville annexed the 
Ironwood development, following which the Greenville Utilities Commission and Bell 
Arthur engaged in a dispute over which of them should provide water service to 
Ironwood.  Bell Arthur already had a six-inch water line in the area, which it had paid for 
with FmHA loans, but those loans had been retired. However, in 1993, Bell Arthur had 
borrowed money from FmHA to finance the extension of water services in its service 
area to territory that did not involve Ironwood. 
 
Bell Arthur’s own engineers determined that providing water service to Ironwood would 
require a 14-inch water line at a cost of $650,000. In May 1995, Bell Arthur agreed in 
writing to provide both temporary and permanent water service to Ironwood and began 
temporary service to a construction trailer there. However, Bell Arthur took no further 
steps to provide water service to Ironwood until 1996 when it obtained necessary 
permits from the state. In August 1996, Bell Arthur’s board resolved to borrow the 
necessary funds to construct the larger water line, and in December 1996 borrowed $1 
million from a private bank for that purpose. Apparently, the dispute between Greenville 
Utilities Commission and Bell Arthur was already in court when Bell Arthur borrowed the 
$1 million because the loan was “conditioned on the outcome of this litigation.” [At 521.] 
 
However, the Greenville Utilities Commission had not been idle. In July 1995, it notified 
the Ironwood developer that it would provide water service and had already ordered the  
pipe to provide the service, and by October 1995, had constructed a 12-inch water line 
to Ironwood. Bell Arthur continued water service to the developer’s construction trailer 
until February 1996.   
 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina [972 F. Supp. 3951 
(1997)] held that Bell Arthur was not entitled to the protection of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), for 
three reasons: 
 
1. It had paid the FmHA loans with which it had constructed the six-inch 
water lines into Ironwood; 
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2. The new FmHA loans it had obtained for water line extensions to an 
area that did not include Ironwood were not directly related to the 
service to that area; and 
3. Bell Arthur was “not capable of providing the requisite service within a 
reasonable time after application was made for the service.”  
 
With respect to the first two reasons, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Bell 
Arthur could not rely upon retired FmHA loans to invoke the protection of 7 U.S.C. 
1926(b), but held that the 1993 FmHA loans that Bell Arthur had obtained to make water 
line extensions to areas in its service area, but that did not include Ironwood, triggered 
the protection of Bell Arthur under 7 U.S.C. 1926(b) for its entire service area, including 
Ironwood. 
 
With respect the third reason, the court held that: 
 
....Bell Arthur is entitled to the protection of § 1926(b) only for 
that area. On this issue, we agree with the district court that 
Bell Arthur was not entitled to protection for the Ironwood 
area because it did not have the capacity to serve that area, 
nor did it have the capacity to provide such service within a 
reasonable time after the request for service was made. [At 
525.] 
 
The court reasoned that with respect to § 1926(b):  
 
Inherent in the concept of providing service or making 
service available is the capacity of providing service or, at a 
minimum, of providing service within a reasonable time. See 
North Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90 
F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a water 
association may establish the availability of service under  
§ 1926(b) by demonstrating, inter alia, that it “has lines and 
adequate facilities to provide service to the disputed areas.” 
(Emphasis added)); see also Lexington–South Elkhorn 
Water Dist. v. City of Wilmore, 93 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 
1996) (noting that “an association’s ability to serve [under 
1926(b)] is predicated on the existence of facilities within or 
adjacent to a disputed property”). Having a six-inch pipeline 
in the ground when a 14-inch line is necessary provides no 
support to a claim that a water association has adequate 
facility to provide service. We conclude that in order to enjoy 
the protection of § 1926(b) for an area, an association must 
demonstrate as a threshold matter that it has adequate 
facilities within or adjacent to the area to provide service to 
2014 Municipal Technical Advisory Service -- 70 
 
the area within a reasonable time after a request for service 
is made....We hold that Bell Arthur’s inadequate six-inch pipe 
in the ground coupled with only a general, unfulfilled intent to 
provide the necessary 14-inch pipe sometime in the future 
does not amount to “service provided or made available.”  
[At 526.] 
 
Also see the unreported case of Dyersburg Suburban Consolidated Utility District v. City 
of Dyersburg, 2007 WL 1859460 (Tenn. Ct. App.)  
 
SCHOOLS9 
A city desiring to take over a county school in an annexed area will need to negotiate 
with the county. The opening sentence in the opinion of Hamilton County v. 
Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d 153 (Tenn. 1958) is, “The sole question in this case is 
whether under § 9 of chapter 113 of the Public Acts of 1955, T.C.A. § 6-318, counties 
are included within the phrase ‘any affected instrumentality of the state of Tennessee.’”  
 
The question was answered in the affirmative, and the case was remanded for further 
proceedings. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not prescribe the terms of settlement 
between the county and the city. It may be significant that the court noted that Hamilton 
County in its bill “prayed for . . . a judgment against the City of Chattanooga for the total 
amount, supra, expended on said schools,” but refused to grant such relief. 
Subsequently the county and the city reached an agreement that was summarized by 
the Chattanooga City Attorney as follows: 
 
In the first annexation, under Chapter 113, Public Acts of 
1955, the City acquired a new school building from Hamilton 
County. The County had issued bonds under the provisions 
of § 49-715 of the Code, the interest and principal being 
payable only from taxes levied on property outside the 
corporate limits of the City. The City entered into an 
agreement with the County to pay to it the amount of bonds 
and interest as they mature, the bonds being serial bonds. 
 
In the next territory annexed there were two school buildings 
belonging to the County which had been constructed several 
years before and bonds issued therefor payable on taxes 
levied on all property in the County, including property in the 
City. The bonds issued were divided between the County 
and City as provided by § 49-711 of the Code. There had 
been some additions to these buildings made from bonds 
                                
9 See Appendices H-1, H-2 and H-3, the explanations of which are indicated in the appropriate parts of 
this text on schools. 
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funds payable only on taxes levied on property outside the 
City, and also the County has spent some of its capital 
outlay funds received from sales tax, in making 
improvements to these schools. The City entered into a 
contract with the County to reimburse them the amount of 
the capital outlay funds and to pay to the County annually 
the balance due on the issue of bonds allocated to the 
school buildings. 
 
The County in each instance agreed to discontinue levying 
taxes on property in annexed territories for the payment of 
the principal of and interest on the urban school bonds. 
 
The City has not paid or agreed to pay any part of the bonds 
outstanding which were issued for school purposes payable 
from taxes levied on all the property in the County, including 
that within the City. The taxpayers of the City will continue to 
pay on the County bonds, including the bonds used on 
constructing buildings in the County outside the City.  
 
Where it was alleged that the annexation of territory would reduce the county area liable 
to taxation for the payment of principal and interest on rural school bonds and thus 
impair the obligation of contract, it was held that this is not a justifiable issue in a  
suit in the nature of quo warranto attacking the reasonableness of an annexation 
ordinance. [See Cope v. Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 298; Spoone v. Morristown, 431 
S.W.2d 827 (1968).] 
 
Fairly serious problems developed in Davidson County and Knox County resulting from 
large annexations by Nashville and Knoxville. The county judges of these two counties 
were quoted in newspaper stories as saying that annexation without unification of the 
county and city schools into a single school system would be intolerable, and this  
position gained substantial support in both communities. The Davidson County problem 
was submitted to arbitration, but the issue became moot when voters approved a single 
metropolitan government, including a unified school system, on June 28, 1962. 
 
Several problems arose from the division of a county school district by a new city 
boundary that cut off county students from the schools they formerly attended. The area 
annexed by Nashville included approximately 12,500 students, 2,600 of whom had been 
attending schools outside the annexed area; an additional 1,650 students lived outside 
but had been attending county schools in the annexed areas. Knox County reported that 
14,840 students were attending 29 schools in the area annexed by Knoxville, 2,275 of 
whom lived beyond the new city boundaries. 
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A Knoxville city school official suggested as a solution to such a situation at one high 
school that the county pay tuition to the city for the nonresident students and that the 
city pay the county for transporting students within the annexed areas. If the tuition rate 
is reasonable, this would seem a sensible solution; such tuition payments may be little 
more than it would cost the county to educate the children directly, and the county 
receives state funds for transportation that are not distributed to city systems. In 
consideration of county transportation for city schools, a city might even agree to accept 
county students at tuition rates equal to the net cost per student to operate the county 
system. 
 
The county judge of Knox County proposed that two high schools be retained by the 
county on a basis of “law and common horse sense.” A precedent for such an 
arrangement exists in Chattanooga, where a large county high school has been located 
in the city for many years. Davidson County school officials proposed that the county 
retain four of the 22 schools in the annexed areas because 40 percent of the enrollment 
in these schools was from beyond the new city boundaries, but the city expressed an 
intention of taking over all schools. 
 
When an annexation case is in litigation, there usually is a considerable time lag before 
the annexation is finally effective. During this time a problem arises as to building or 
enlarging school facilities to take care of an increasing number of students attending 
schools in the area subject to annexation.  [See Appendix H-1.]  The law provides that 
during the time that any annexation ordinance is being contested, the annexing 
municipality and the county governing body may enter into an agreement to provide for 
new, expanded and/or upgraded services and facilities. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f). 
 
Preliminary negotiations between Nashville and Davidson County school officials on 
existing school properties reflect typical conflicts in points of view. The county places a 
replacement value of $11,262,732.37 on the buildings, sites, improvements and 
equipment of 22 schools in the annexed area, which had an original cost of 
$7,558,752.88, but an “asking price” was not specified. The city had previously offered 
$6.4 million on the grounds that 40 percent of the total county property assessment was 
in the annexed area, and this amount represented 40 percent of the total rural school 
bonds outstanding against these schools. The city proposed no division of outstanding  
countywide bonds issued for these schools on the grounds that city taxpayers had paid 
and would continue to pay taxes for their retirement, but this was rejected by the county 
on the basis that the city had received its ADA share of these bonds when issued. 
 
Knox County officials stated that the loss of the property tax base in areas annexed 
would make it impossible to issue rural school bonds (amortized by a tax levy outside 
the city), and to issue countywide bonds to obtain the amount of funds needed by the 
county would require an unreasonably large issue because of the required ADA sharing 
with the city. A suggested partial solution to this problem, which received some city and  
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county support, was that the city waive its share of such a bond issue if the county 
would agree to apply the city share against the amount eventually determined to be 
chargeable against the city for county school facilities taken over by the city. 
 
Eventually an agreement was worked out between Knoxville and Knox County that 
covered several of the problems discussed above. [See Appendix H-2.] The agreement 
was negotiated by a “school negotiating committee” and ratified by both local governing 
bodies. The negotiating committee was composed of two members of county court, the 
county school superintendent, the county solicitor, one city council member, one city 
school board member, the city school superintendent, and the city law director. 
 
Twenty-eight schools, valued at $12 million, were transferred to the city. One school 
offering a countywide special education program was continued under county operation. 
The city agreed to pay the debt service on about $4 million of the outstanding rural 
school bonds of the county that had been invested in the schools taken over. The city 
also waived its ADA short of a $2 million countywide school bond issue, the proceeds of 
which had been spent primarily on the annexed schools. Further, there was provided a 
cooperative system of financing all future capital improvements. The later provision 
includes ongoing planning and capital budgeting of all school facilities in both the city 
and county. 
 
Section V of the agreement covers the question of which pupils can attend which school 
with or without tuition. Paragraph (D) requires tuition payments for pupils who resided 
inside the city at the time annexation proceedings were begun and later moved outside 
the city, including the annexed area. This provision has been cumbersome and virtually 
impossible to enforce. All of § V has been rendered null and void by a subsequent 
agreement reached in connection with the adoption of a county sales tax earmarked for 
schools. The essence of the latter agreement is that tuition payments are entirely 
eliminated, and the county provides transportation for city pupils on a reimbursable 
basis. 
 
A byproduct of annexation and the resulting transfer of county school facilities to the city 
was the desire on the part of the county to raise its teacher salaries to the level of city 
teachers. The cost of the salary increases would have required a large increase in the 
tax rate (the county needed about $300,000 but would have had to raise in excess of $1 
million to allow for the city’s ADA share of the levy). The city school system did not need 
these additional funds at the time.  Section VII of the “Agreement for Transfer of 
Schools” was amended to provide for an additional payment to the county, permitting an 
increase in county teacher salaries to the level of city teachers without raising the 
county tax rate. In exchange, the county agreed to provide transportation for pupils in 
the annexed areas for one year. 
 
An extensive annexation by Memphis, in four phases (effective on December 31 in each 
of the  years 1968, 1969, 1971, and 1972), resulted in an arbitration proceeding with 
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Shelby County involving 27 county schools located in the annexed areas. The county 
asked for approximately $17 million, the board of arbitration awarded $1,917,904, and 
on appeal a chancery court, in a consent order, awarded $8,213,768 to be taken from 
future ADA funds due the city school system. The city’s brief before the arbitration 
board, the board’s memorandum, and the chancellor’s consent order are reproduced in 
Appendix H-3.  
 
AGREEMENT FOR NEW OR IMPROVED SERVICES AND FACILITIES 
During the time that any annexation ordinance is being contested as provided herein, 
the annexing municipality and the county governing body (and/or affected school, 
sanitary, or utility district) may enter into an agreement to provide for new, expanded, or 
upgraded services and facilities (including, but not limited to, equipment, land, and 
buildings) and capital expenditures (including sale of bonds) to finance such services 
and facilities, which agreement shall include an equitable division of the cost and 
liabilities of such capital expenditures between the annexing municipality and the county 
governing body (and/or affected school, sanitary, or utility district) upon final 
determination of such contested annexation ordinance. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f). 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
“DEANNEXATION” AND OTHER BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS 
 
CONTRACTION OF BOUNDARIES (DEANNEXATION) 
There are two ways for a city to “deannex” territory, both of which are covered in T.C.A. 
§ 6-51-201. 
 
By Referendum After the Adoption of an Ordinance by the City’s Governing Body 
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a), presently provides that: 
 
Any incorporated city or town, whether it was incorporated 
by general or special act, may contract its limits within any 
given territory; provided that three-fourths (3/4) of the 
qualified voters voting in an election thereon assent to.  
 
That statute is highly confusing due to several amendments. It is not clear on its face 
whether the vote must be three-fourths of the city voters voting or three-fourths of the 
voters voting in the territory to be deannexed. However, in light of the history of T.C.A. 
§§ 6-51-201(a) and 6-51-202, the three-fourths vote probably means a three-fourth vote 
of the voters voting in a city election. 
  
Complicated reasoning supporting this conclusion follows:  That statute derives from 
Public Acts 1875, Chapter 92, and appears in Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, which 
itself was a part of Article III of that code. Under Article III, a city could add territory or 
contract its limits. With respect to the contraction of limits the city had to adopt an 
ordinance authorizing a referendum on the contraction. The contraction had to be 
approved by a three-fourths vote “of the voters qualified to vote in the election of mayor 
and aldermen or governing body....” For that reason, the three-fourths vote in Article III 
is, arguably, three-fourths of the voters voting in a city election. 
 
Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, was specifically amended by Public Acts 1955, 
Chapter 61, as follows: 
 
Any incorporated city or town, whether the same shall have 
been incorporated by general or special Act, may contract its 
limits within any given territory, provided three-fourths of the 
qualified voters voting in an election thereon assent thereto.  
 
Public Acts 1955, Chapter 113, is the first general annexation law of the state.  In § 10, 
without mentioning Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, whether the referendum had to 
be preceded by an ordinance, and whether the vote was a three-fourths vote of the 
voters voting in the territory or three-fourths of the voters voting in the city, simply said 
that: 
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Any city incorporated under any Public or Private Act of the 
State of Tennessee may contract its city limits within any 
given territory provided three-fourths of the qualified voters 
voting in an election thereon assent thereto. 
 
Both of those public acts were codified in T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a) as they appear as 
indicated above. Although the language relative to the “voters qualified to vote in the 
election of mayor and aldermen or governing body” was dropped, it still did not limit the 
voters to those residing in the territory to be deannexed. 
  
T.C.A. § 6-51-202 does require that the referendum be held pursuant to an ordinance 
describing the territory to be deannexed and requires that the deannexation be 
approved by a vote of three-fourths of the voters. That statute is consistent with the way 
it appeared in Public Acts 1875 and in Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3323, which, again, 
applied to both additions of territory to cities and to the contraction of city limits. 
 
By Initiative of the City’s Governing Body 
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(b) provides a completely separate method of deannexation. It was 
added by Public Acts 1984, Chapter 731. That statute authorizes deannexation by 
ordinance upon the initiative of the city’s governing body, by a majority vote of the “total 
membership of the city legislative body.”  
 
However, a petition of 10 percent of the voters residing in the area to be deannexed that 
is submitted to the city recorder within 75 days of the final reading of the deannexation 
ordinance triggers a referendum on the deannexation. The referendum is held at the 
“next general election.” Only voters residing in the territory proposed for deannexation 
are entitled to vote.  It requires a majority vote of those voters to approve the 
deannexation. 
 
It is not clear whether the “general election” at which the referendum must be held 
refers to the next general municipal election or to the next general state election; 
presumably, it could refer to either. T.C.A. § 2-1-104(a)(7) defines the term “election” as 
“a general election for which membership in a political party in order to participate 
therein is not required.” General city elections and the “regular November [state] 
election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even-numbered 
years” appear to meet that definition.  [See T.C.A. § 2-1-104(25).] 
 
Once an area is deannexed, the city may continue to levy and collect taxes in the area 
to pay the excluded territory’s share of any debt contracted prior to the deannexation. 
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-201 – 204. 
  
CHALLENGE TO DEANNEXATION BY REFERENDUM 
Only one case interprets the deannexation statute:  unreported Rich v. City of 
Chattanooga, 2014 WL 1513349 (Tenn. Ct. App).  It dealt with deannexation by 
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referendum under Tennessee Code Annotated, § 6-51-201(b).  On the date of the 
general election on August 2, 2012, a referendum was held in Hamilton and Marion 
counties on the question of whether certain properties annexed by the city in 1972 and 
1994 should be deannexed.  The referendum, which passed 21-20, included the vote 
from both counties.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s quo warranto and 
declaratory judgment challenge to the deannexation, but overturned the referendum 
election because it wrongfully disenfranchised some voters. 
 
With respect to the plaintiff’s quo warranto claim, the trial court had held that quo 
warranto was the proper claim, but had been untimely filed.  But the Court of Appeals 
held that quo warranto relief is not available in deannexation cases, reasoning that: 
 
According to the plain language of Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 6-51-201, deannexation may be accomplished 
in one of two ways, either through an election receiving 
approval of three-fourths of the qualified voters or via an 
ordinance receiving support of a majority of the city 
legislative body…If annexation is initiated via ordinance, 
however, ten percent of the citizens residing in the affected 
area may file a petition opposing the deannexation, and a 
resultant referendum election will be conducted…if a 
majority of the voters fail to vote for deannexation “the 
contraction ordinance shall be void.”  This is the sole method 
provided by statute for review of deannexation by ordinance. 
 [At 7.] [Emphasis is mine.] 
 
Pointing to the function of quo warranto in annexation cases, the Court said: 
 
As our Supreme Court has declared, “‘[w]ithin the four 
corners of the quo warranto statute lies the entire jurisdiction 
and authority of the Courts to review the actions of 
municipalities in enacting annexation ordinances.’”  
Highwoods Prop., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 
708 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting City of Oak Ridge v. Roane 
County, 563 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1976)).  The Court also 
noted that the right to challenge an annexation ordinance is 
a “statutory right” that “in its very origin is limited.” 
Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d at 
708 (quoting Brent v. Town of Greeneville, 203 Tenn. 60, 
309 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1957). 
 
Utilizing the same rationale, the legislature has provided a 
statutory mechanism to challenge deannexation by 
ordinance, which is to file a petition opposing the ordinance 
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that has been signed by ten percent of the registered voters 
residing in the affected area…A referendum shall then be 
held at the next general election, and the voters shall decide 
the fate of the proposed deannexation…Such is the method 
of review provided by the legislature and this Court is without 
authority to expand this statutory remedy…[At 7-8.] 
 
With respect to the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims, the Court of Appeals, 
rejected that avenue for such a claim in essentially the same language it used to reject 
their claims under quo warranto, adding that: 
 
The [Supreme] Court further explained, “[s]ubject to some 
exceptions, a declaratory judgment action should not be 
considered where special statutory proceedings provide an 
adequate remedy.”  Highwoods Props., 297 S.W.3d at 709 
(quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 
838 (Tenn. 2008)….  We conclude that the same rationale 
applies to a challenge to deannexation by ordinance.  When 
challenging deannexation by ordinance, the statute provides 
for a referendum election as the only remedy.  Where, as 
here, the statutorily provided review of a referendum election 
was available to and successfully utilized by Plaintiffs, and 
where the ordinance was invalidated by such action, there 
should be no further review by the courts because such 
further review is not specifically provided by statute.  See 
e.g. Highwood Props., 297 S.W.3d at 708.  Plaintiffs have 
not alleged that the passage of this Ordinance constituted an 
ultra vires act…[At 8-9.] 
 
The trial court’s reliance on Committee to Oppose the Annexation of Topside and 
Louisville Road v. City of Alcoa, 891 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1994) in defining who was a 
qualified voter in the deannexation of the property in question, was proper held the 
Court of Appeals.  The trial court had interpreted the language in Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 6-51-201(b)(3) speaking of voters eligible to vote in the deannexation 
referendum as “anyone registered to vote in either Hamilton or Marion County, who 
resides on a lot, any part of which is part of the area to be deannexed.”  [At 9]  The 
Court of Appeals declared that Topside & Louisville Rd., had held that the phrase 
“qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for annexation” in Tennessee Code 
Annotated, § 6-51-105(a), includes the curtilage of the property of such residents, and 
approved the extension of that definition to deannexation by referendum. 
 
The voter qualification component of this case is distinguished from the voter 
qualification component in the Topside and Louisville Road case in that it recognized a  
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Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional issue in such elections.  The Court of Appeals 
agreed with the trial court’s decision that: 
 
An election regarding a deannexation ordinance would 
“invoke the protections against infringements of the 
fundamental right to vote.”  See e.g. Kramer v. Union Free 
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 [parallel citations 
omitted by me] quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 665 [parallel citations omitted by me] [“once 
the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be 
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) [At 10.]  
 
BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS BY CONTRACT 
Two contiguous cities may adjust a common boundary by contract to eliminate 
confusion and uncertainty about its location or to conform the boundary to certain man-
made or natural geographical features. T.C.A. § 6-51-302. 
 
MUNICIPAL MERGERS  
T.C.A. § 6-51-401 et seq. authorizes municipalities that share contiguous boundaries 
and that are located in the same county to merge using one of two methods. 
 
Resolution and Referendum 
This method requires the governing bodies of municipalities proposing to merge to pass 
a resolution (or joint ordinance in the case of a proposed merger involving a home rule 
municipality) requesting a referendum upon the proposed merger. The resolution (or 
joint ordinance) must be passed by a majority vote of the members to which each of the 
governing bodies of the municipalities are entitled. The resolution states the name of the 
municipality that will result from the merger and the charter under which it will operate, 
which may be the general law mayor-aldermanic charter, the general law manager-
commission charter, or one of the charters of the merging municipalities. The resolution 
may also establish the wards or districts of the new municipality if its new charter 
provides for such wards or districts. The wording of the merger question that must 
appear on the ballot is contained in the statute and takes into account the possibility that 
the merger will involve a home rule municipality and that the charter of the new 
municipality will be a home rule charter. The referendum must pass by a majority of 
those voting in each municipality for the merger to become effective. If the referenda are 
successful, the merger is effective 120 days after the certification of the election results. 
 
Petition and Referendum 
Under this method, 10 percent of the registered voters in each municipality may petition 
for a merger. The petition must contain essentially the same information that must  
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appear in the resolutions (or joint ordinance in the case of a proposed merger involving 
a home rule municipality). The rules that govern the merger referenda under the 
resolution and referendum method apply to this method. 
 
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-406–409 govern questions pertinent to the continuation of ordinances of 
the municipalities that have merged under both methods and the financial integration of 
the “old” municipalities into the “new” municipality. 
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APPENDICES PAGE 
 
 
Appendix A  Annexation Feasibility Studies 
 
Appendix A-1  Annexation Study - Sunny Hill Road Vicinity, 
Brownsville, Tennessee (March 28, 2013) conducted by Brownsville 
Planning Staff and Brownsville Energy Authority with Assistance 
from Southwest Tennessee Development District. 
 
Appendix A-2 Annexation Feasibility Study, City of Franklin, 
Tennessee, City of Franklin Planning Staff (November, 2006). 
 
 
Appendix B  Amending Comprehensive Growth Plans.  David Conner, County 
Technical Assistance Service and Dennis Huffer, Municipal 
Technical Advisory Service, May 2005.   
 
 
Appendix C  Public Acts 2014, Chapter 707. 
 
 
Appendix D  Annexation Ordinance and Resolution Adopting Plan of Services 
 
Appendix  D-1  Annexation Ordinance (Draft), City of 
Nolensville, Tennessee (2014).  (Note that this ordinance reflects 
an annexation done by referendum.  T.C.A. 6-51-104-105 provides 
that the call for an annexation by referendum is done by resolution. 
However, there appears to be no reason the call cannot be made 
by ordinance). 
 
   Appendix D-2   Resolution Adopting Plan of Services for above 
Annexation by Referendum, City of Nolensville (2014). 
 
 
Appendix E  Annexation Ordinances and Plans of Services 
 
Appendix E-1 Multi-Area Annexation Plan of Services 
Proposal to Planning Commission, City of Bartlett, Tennessee 
(2013). 
 
   Appendix  E-2  Annexation Ordinance, City of Franklin, 
Tennessee.  
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   Appendix  E-3  Ordinance Adopting Plan of Services and 
Annexing Same Territory, City of Signal Mountain, Tennessee 
(2006).  
   
 
Appendix F  Progress Report on Plans of Service Provided for Area 3A, and 
Notice of Public Hearing Provided for Area 3A  in accordance with 
T.C.A. section 6-51-108(b), City of Chattanooga (2010). 
 
 
Appendix G   Conveyances of Utility Districts to Annexing Municipalities 
   
Appendix G-1 Jackson Suburban Utility District to City of 
Jackson, Tennessee (1961). 
 
   Appendix G-2 Memphis Suburban Utility District to City of 
Memphis, Tennessee (1957). 
 
Appendix G-3 North Johnson City Utility District to City of 
Johnson City, Tennessee (no date). 
 
Appendix G-4 First Utility District of Anderson County to City 
of Clinton, Tennessee (1986). 
 
 
Appendix H  Conveyance of Schools to Annexing Municipalities 
 
   Appendix H-1  Davidson County to City of Nashville (1961). 
 
   Appendix H-2   Knox County to City of Knoxville (1963). 
 
Appendix H-3 Arbitration Brief for Memphis Board of 
Education; Board of Arbitration  Award, Shelby County vs. Memphis 
Board of Education; Chancellor’s Consent Order, Shelby County 
vs. Memphis Board of Education;  Contract Between Shelby County 
Board of Education and the Board of Education of the Memphis 
City Schools (1974).      
 
  



































































































































































